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INTRODUCTION
Tragically, modern warfare routinely turns victims into
persecutors by forcing men, women, and children—as part of
the harm inflicted on them—to harm others. Recent United
Nations (U.N.) reports from Afghanistan describe a local militia’s practice of using children in its campaign of theft and arbi1
trary killing. Women and girls kidnapped in Nigeria by Boko
Haram in 2014 describe their forced participation in military
operations, including carrying ammunition and luring targets
2
into ambushes. A forced recruit of a rebel group in the Democratic Republic of Congo described to the United Nations Security Council his decade-long experience of fighting in the front
lines, looting, and “violating international humanitarian law”
3
after his forceful recruitment at age twelve. In Côte d’Ivoire,
where sexual violence was used as a weapon of war by government and resistance forces throughout the civil war, men report being forced to rape fellow prisoners and their own rela4
tives in order to facilitate domination by the armed force.
Reports from Somalia tell of Al-Shabaab leaders threatening
child soldiers with death if they refuse to execute the violent
punishment the group metes out on people who breach its
5
rules. Yet, through various amendments, Congress has barred
individuals who have participated in the persecution of others
from receiving nearly all immigration benefits, including hu1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “TODAY WE SHALL ALL DIE”: AFGHANISTAN’S
STRONGMEN AND THE LEGACY OF IMPUNITY 31–33, 33 n.29 (2015) (indicating
that a U.N. official reported to Human Rights Watch that complaints had been
received concerning forced recruitment of child soldiers in Afghanistan).
2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “THOSE TERRIBLE WEEKS IN THEIR CAMP”:
BOKO HARAM VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA
2, 25–27 (2014).
3. Meetings Coverage, Security Council, Former Child Soldier Describes
Forced Recruitment During Security Council Debate, Urges International
Community to Aid Other Children Released by Armed Groups, U.N. Meetings
Coverage SC/11832 (Mar. 25, 2015).
4. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “MY HEART IS CUT”: SEXUAL VIOLENCE BY
REBELS AND PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE 4–5, 23–24, 31–32,
74–75 (2007) (providing a summary and discussing rebel involvement, forced
incest, and government involvement including forced rape by prisoners).
5. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO PLACE FOR CHILDREN: CHILD RECRUITMENT, FORCED MARRIAGE, AND ATTACKS ON SCHOOLS IN SOMALIA 28–29
(2012).
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manitarian protection, even for those who are also the victims
6
of persecution. As a result, the all too pervasive dynamic of using persecution to create persecutors has created a prolonged
crisis in U.S. immigration law.
The Supreme Court recognized the “difficult line-drawing
problems” created by attempts to separate those who assist in
persecution from the victims of that persecution when, due to
7
the nature of the conflict, an individual may well be both.
Nonetheless, the Court twice tried to draw those lines. First, in
Fedorenko v. United States, the Court interpreted the persecutor bar to disqualify from entry to the U.S. a Nazi prisoner of
war who then served as an armed guard at a concentration
camp. As a guard, Fedorenko received pay, short periods of
8
leave in the nearby town, and recognition for his service. The
Court declared that “all those who assisted in the persecution
of civilians” were excluded from the United States regardless of
9
whether their actions were voluntary.
Next, in Negusie v. Holder, the Court vacated the lower
court decision to bar from refugee protection Negusie, a former
6. For ease of reference, I discuss the “persecutor bar” as if it is a unitary
feature in immigration law. As explained in Part II, however, a version of the
bar with the same core language appears in multiple provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act: 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E) (2012) (barring admission of any alien who was associated with the Nazis between March 23, 1933,
and May 8, 1945, and who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, national origin, or
political opinion”); id. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (establishing removability on the same
basis); id. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (excluding individuals who have participated in the
persecution of others from the definition of “refugee”); id. § 1158(b)(2)(A) (barring asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (barring withholding of removal); id.
§ 1229b(c)(5) (barring cancellation of removal); id. § 1255(a) (requiring admissibility to become a lawful permanent resident and 8 U.S.C. § 1182 does not
provide a waiver of inadmissibility for the persecutor bar); id. § 1427 (requiring an immigrant to be a permanent resident in order to naturalize). The
ground of inadmissibility and removability is limited to association with the
Nazis, while the bar to refugee protection and cancellation of removal is not.
But the interpretation of the bar’s scope hinges on the language common to
these provisions, and the legislative history shows that the provisions are derived from the same source and share similar statements of congressional intent.
7. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981). The Court
compared the acts performed by concentration camp inmates who cut the hair
of female inmates before they were executed with the acts of a paid, armed
guard who shot at inmates attempting to escape the camp but who was also a
prisoner of war. Id.
8. Id. at 500.
9. Id. at 512.
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Eritrean prisoner who was beaten, tortured, and forced to perform the duties of an armed guard at the prison where he was
also confined. Negusie applied for protection in the U.S. after
he eventually fled the camp where he had been held by swim10
ming to a cargo ship and hiding in a storage container. The
Negusie Court remanded the case to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) with instructions to reconsider its interpretation
of the persecutor bar, explaining that “motive and intent” along
11
with “voluntariness” may be relevant to the bar’s scope. For
12
13
years, the immigration agency failed to answer the call. In
the absence of an authoritative agency interpretation, federal
circuit courts and immigration judges have been forced to ar14
rive at their own conclusions, often with divergent results. Af10. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514–16 (2009).
11. Id. at 523–24.
12. In referring to the “immigration agency” or “the agency,” I mean those
parts of the executive branch charged with adjudicating and interpreting immigration law through precedential decision-making or formal rule-making.
These entities include the U.S. Attorney General and the Board of Immigration Appeals (part of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration Review), which have the authority to issue precedential decisions
interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1),
(d)(1) (2012). The Attorney General also has rule-making authority, which she
shares with the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 8
U.S.C. § 1103(a), (g). Separately, DHS adjudicates applications for immigration benefits, which involve the application of the persecutor bar. Id. § 1103(a).
13. BIA sought supplemental briefing twice on remand from the Supreme
Court and then suspended those requests twice in favor of rule-making. See
Letter from David Neal, Chairman, BIA, to Hiroko Kusuda, Loyola Law Clinic
Det. Project & DHS-ICE Det. Ctr. (June 15, 2009) (on file with author) (seeking briefs regarding the persecutor bar from parties and amici curiae); Letter
from Rebecca Moguera, Legal Assistant, BIA, to Scholars for Int’l Refugee Law
et al. (Feb. 6, 2013) (on file with author) (reinstating the initial request for
supplemental briefing). However, the BIA suspended both of these requests.
See E-mail from Benjamin Casper, Visiting Assoc. Clinical Professor of Law,
Univ. of Minn. Law School, to author (Sept. 28, 2016) (on file with author).
14. See Martine Forneret, Pulling the Trigger: An Analysis of Circuit
Court Review of the “Persecutor Bar,” 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1007, 1017–38
(2013) (examining the inconsistent implementation of the persecutor bar
across circuits and describing the four categories of “triggering factors” circuit
courts use to apply the bar). The Fourth Circuit, in one unpublished case,
stated that the bar applies so long as the applicant’s conduct objectively furthered the persecution of others even without personal participation in the
persecutory acts. In another case interpreting the same language in a different
statute, that court required active involvement and a causal nexus between
the applicant’s behavior and instances of persecution. Compare Ntamack v.
Holder, 372 F. App’x 407 (4th Cir. 2010), with Haddam v. Holder, 547 F. App’x
306 (4th Cir. 2013). The Seventh Circuit has held that an applicant’s state of
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ter several false starts, the BIA has called for supplemental
briefs from the parties and amici curiae to address whether an
involuntariness or duress exception exists to limit the application of the persecutor bar and, if so, what standard should ap15
ply. This Article examines the international and domestic origins of the persecutor bar, along with documents preserved in
the French National Archive, to answer these questions.
By analyzing—for the first time—policy directives and appellate decisions preserved in the French National Archive, this
Article recovers the history of the bar’s application by its frontline adjudicators at the time Congress first incorporated it
wholesale into U.S. law—a history that conflicts with
Fedorenko’s conceptions of the bar’s original meaning and
Negusie’s conception of this history’s relevance to U.S. asylum
law. While other scholars have offered legal and moral theories
regarding the role of culpability in the application of the persecutor bar, none have offered support for a duress defense based
16
on the bar’s original scope. The unique historical analysis promind is irrelevant to the bar’s application, while the Eighth Circuit has examined an applicant’s “shared . . . persecutory motive[ ],” and the Ninth Circuit
requires “purposeful assistance.” See, e.g., Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998
(9th Cir. 2013); Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2005); Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 812 (8th Cir. 2001). Since Negusie, the Second Circuit and others have remanded cases involving the persecutor bar because it is
unclear what interpretation they should apply and therefore unclear how they
should review the agency’s decisions. See Zi Xin Chen v. Holder, 552 F. App’x
26 (2d Cir. 2014); Maiga v. Holder, 345 F. App’x 634 (2d. Cir. 2009); Ru Lian v.
Holder, 326 F. App’x 315 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Inconsistencies pervade
the agency decisions as well. One immigration judge determined that a member of the Oromo ethnic group, who had been tortured by the Ethiopian government as a child and then forced to fight for that army, was ineligible for
asylum because he fired on civilians after watching commanders kill people
who refused or tried to escape. In re Aseged Kebede, 2003 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS
4088 (B.I.A. 2003). Yet a different judge held that a child soldier for the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, who was given cocaine and other drugs and
then ordered to kill people, was not disqualified under the persecutor bar.
Sackie v. Ashcroft, 270 F. Supp. 2d 596 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
15. See Amicus Invitation No. 16-08-08, Amicus Invitation (Duress Exception to Persecutor Bar), B.I.A. (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/
882811/download.
16. See Stephen J. Massey, Individual Responsibility for Assisting the Nazis in Persecuting Civilians, 71 MINN. L. REV. 97, 112–16, 113 n.90 (1986) (discussing the overriding importance of the persecutor bar’s original application
rather than its text to establishing its meaning). Compare Melani Johns,
Comment, Adjusting the Asylum Bar: Negusie v. Holder and the Need To Incorporate a Defense of Duress into the “Persecutor Bar,” 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 235, 261 (2010) (recommending that Congress amend the definition of
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vided here supports a duress defense with evidence that concerns for individual responsibility were present at the time of

“refugee” to include duress as a statutory defense to the persecutor bar to
promote uniformity), and Karl Goodman, Comment, Negusie v. Holder: The
End of the Strict Liability Persecutor Bar?, 13 CUNY L. REV. 143, 159–66
(2009) (arguing that the avoidance of “absurd or futile results,” comparable
practices of other countries, and policy goals of the INA support duress defense), with Tasha Wiesman, Comment, Denying Relief to the Persecutor: An
Argument in Favor of Adopting the Dissenting Opinion of Negusie v. Holder,
44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 559 (2011) (arguing that a bright-line exclusion of all
past persecutors is required because case-by-case assessments of individual
facts will lead to disuniformity and that the Convention Against Torture provides adequate protection for individuals forced to persecute others). Bryan
Lonegan asserts that the persecutor bar should not apply to any child forced to
fight when he was younger than sixteen based on the international agreements and U.S. laws that designate child soldiers as victims, not perpetrators
and recognize their diminished mental capacity due to age. Bryan Lonegan,
Sinners or Saints: Child Soldiers and the Persecutor Bar to Asylum After
Negusie v. Holder, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 71 (2011). Abbe L. Dienstag reviewed the utilitarian, retributive, and symbolic functions of a duress defense
in civil immigration law and denaturalization proceedings and argues that
these principles militate its availability for what she terms “victim accomplice,” a concept Justice Stevens identified in his Fedorenko dissent. Abbe L.
Dienstag, Comment, Fedorenko v. United States: War Crimes, the Defense of
Duress, and American Nationality Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 120, 162–70 (1982);
see also Leah Durland, Comment, Overcoming the Persecutor Bar: Applying a
Purposeful Mens Rea Requirement to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), 32 HAMLINE L.
REV. 571, 596–608 (2009) (arguing that the Model Penal Code’s purposeful
standard, with the burden on the applicant, should be required rather than
duress because it would lead to more uniform results while protecting deserving applicants); Mark Philipp, Case Note, Assisting in Persecution: Analyzing
the Decision in Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x 325 (5th Cir. 2007), 34 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 417, 441–44 (2010) (advocating for a totality of the circumstances test
to assess culpability that would be more flexible than the defense of duress).
Similarly, scholars who have examined the history of the International
Refugee Organization (IRO) and its Constitution—the source of the persecutor
bar in U.S. law as discussed in Part II—have not explored the administration
of that bar. Louise W. Holborn authored an exhaustive review of the IRO and
explained that “the Constitution was only a framework for the work of the
IRO, and the spirit in which this work was to be carried out would be far more
important than the framework itself,” but her review does not discuss application of the persecutor bar. LOUISE W. HOLBORN, THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION, A SPECIALIZED AGENCY OF THE UNITED NATIONS: ITS HISTORY AND WORK, 1946-1952, at 53, 175 (1956); see also GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL
& JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 161–90 (3d ed. 2007)
(describing the exclusions contained in the United Nations agreements on the
Status of Refugees that relate to the IRO’s persecutor bar); NEHEMIAH
ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: ITS HISTORY, CONTENTS, AND INTERPRETATION, A COMMENTARY 65–69 (1953).
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17

the bar’s inception. This history builds on philosophical
frameworks offered by other scholars to create a coherent doctrine that should define the bar’s application under current
law. In particular, the Article engages Stephen Massey’s scholarship in the wake of Fedorenko, which recast the majority’s
opinion in terms of moral philosophy and proposed a frame18
work to assign individual responsibility for collective action.
Unlike the Court in Fedorenko, however, Massey recognized
that as a philosophical matter, “voluntariness” is crucial to at19
tributing moral responsibility. With the Court’s decision in
Negusie, the Court put voluntariness, motive, and intent back
on the table. This Article, then, picks up where Massey left off.
While the Court may have been correct in applying the
persecutor bar to Fedorenko but reversing its application to
Negusie, the Court’s reasoning in these cases was not. I argue
that the proper resolution of these and future cases requires interpreting the persecutor bar to incorporate the defense of duress as a test for moral choice. Inclusion of a duress defense
reconciles the bar’s legislative history, its sources in international law, and the application of similar exclusions in immigration law. At the same time, a duress defense provides a coherent, administrable, and principled standard with which to
draw the difficult lines the Supreme Court foresaw.
Part I begins with a discussion of Supreme Court cases
that examine various iterations of the persecutor bar. While
raising different factors for the immigration agency to consider
when interpreting the bar, these decisions ultimately leave a
vast space within which the agency can make its policy choice.
Part II returns to the source of the persecutor bar by describing
its drafting in the International Refugee Organization (IRO)
Constitution and the decisions of the IRO’s appellate Eligibility
Review Board, which demonstrate how that bar was originally
understood and administered. These sources show that the bar
was not applied to victims of persecution—even if those victims
were forced to persecute others. Though the original documents
do not reflect a fully-formed duress defense, they display a con17. Massey, supra note 16.
18. Id. at 98–99, 144–49; see also id. at 116 (“Rather than openly
acknowledge that it was making a moral decision regarding the level of moral
responsibility necessary to find that an individual has met the legal standard
[for assisting in persecuting civilians], the Court pretended that its conclusion
was dictated by neutral arguments of statutory construction.”).
19. See id. at 143–44.
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cern for culpability that undermines the Supreme Court’s analysis in Fedorenko and the BIA’s even stricter application of the
bar. Part III examines the persecutor bar’s multiple appearances in U.S. law and Congress’s common reference to the Constitution of the IRO, international refugee agreements, and decisions of military tribunals as the sources informing its
understanding of the persecutor bar. I assert that in light of
this evidence of congressional intent, the persecutor bar should
be interpreted consistently with these three sources. Part IV, in
turn, explores the meaning of the exclusions contained in these
sources, including international refugee agreements and the jurisprudence developed by the war crimes tribunals. In both
contexts, the duress defense emerged to limit liability for acts
that would otherwise be considered persecutory.
I conclude that the immigration agency should interpret
the persecutor bar so as not to apply to acts committed under
duress. Using the standard developed by the international military tribunals and applied to the international refugee agreements, the bar should not apply to a person whose acts were
done to avoid an immediate and irreparable harm to her or her
family, where she could not escape the harm threatened
against her, and the harm she caused was no greater than the
harm threatened against her. This standard requires more
than coercion; it requires the absence of choice. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the bar’s historical development, the various statements of congressional intent, the
United States’ international treaty obligations, and the agency’s application of similar exclusions in immigration law. Moreover, an interpretation that contemplates duress represents
sound policy by drawing a line between those victims who chose
to engage in the persecution of others and those who did not.
I. A CLEAN SLATE ON WHICH TO WRITE
The Supreme Court has considered the meaning of the persecutor bar twice. In Fedorenko, it determined that the bar
made no exception for involuntary assistance in the persecution
of others. In Negusie, the Court decided that motive, intent,
and voluntariness may indeed be relevant. With Negusie, however, the Court declined to interpret the meaning of the persecutor bar itself. It instead directed the immigration agency to
reconsider its position that the bar applies without regard to an
individual’s will. Further, the Court severed the meaning of the
persecutor bar at issue in Fedorenko from the one at issue in
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Negusie. This Part examines the progressive interpretation of
the persecutor bar by the Court and the BIA and then outlines
the considerable space left for the immigration agency as it determines the bar’s scope anew. Part III then explains why the
two versions of the bar must be construed together.
Before commencing the discussion of the jurisprudence
surrounding the persecutor bar and its pitfalls, a brief review of
terminology is required. The Supreme Court and the immigration agency refer at different times to voluntariness, coercion,
20
knowledge, intent, motivation and culpability. These concepts
are derived from criminal law and are critical to understanding
how the persecutor bar was historically applied. At base is the
21
notion of culpability or blameworthiness. Culpability ties lia22
bility to conduct that warrants moral condemnation. Accordingly, criminal liability generally requires the combination of a
23
culpable mental state and an unlawful act. Intent is one of
these mental states. Traditionally, an intentional mental state
signified that an individual intended to engage in specific conduct and either wanted his acts to cause certain consequences
or knew that those consequences were substantially certain to

20. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516–23 (2009) (referring to motive, intent, knowledge, coercion, duress, and culpability); Fedorenko v. United
States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981) (referring to voluntariness); In re Lapienecks
18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 464 (B.I.A. 1983) (referring to motive and intent).
21. Culpability & Blameworthy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
22. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (“American criminal
law has long considered a defendant’s intention—and therefore his moral
guilt—to be critical to the degree of his criminal culpability, and the Court has
found criminal penalties to be unconstitutionally excessive in the absence of
intentional wrongdoing.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Herbert
Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1435 (1968) (“The law promotes the general security by building confidence that those whose conduct does not warrant condemnation will not be convicted of a crime. . . . The tendency of present
thought in the United States is to consider this so fundamental that criminal
liability without regard to culpability would raise the gravest constitutional
question, at least if major sanctions are involved.”).
23. See generally Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952)
(noting that liability requires the “concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with
an evil-doing hand”); Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 594–95 (1963) (“The most important aspect of the
[Model Penal] Code is its affirmation of the centrality of mens rea, an affirmation that is brilliantly supported by its careful articulation of the elements of
liability and of the various modes of culpability to which attention must be
paid in framing the definitions of the various criminal offenses.”).
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24

result from his acts. More recently, criminal law distinguishes
between intent and knowledge so that one acts purposely if “it
is his conscious object” to cause a result and knowingly if “he is
aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause
25
such a result.” The term “intent” can also encompass both
“general intent” and “specific intent.” General intent refers to
only the intention to make the bodily movement which constitutes the criminal act, while specific intent requires the intent
26
to bring about the consequences of the act. Because of the
heightened level of intent involved, the mental states of specific
intent or purpose are more culpable than other mental states,
such as recklessness or negligence. Motive sits apart from intent in that intent relates to the means for accomplishing something (A intends to kill B), while motive relates to the ends (be27
cause A wants B’s money).
Strict liability lies in contrast to the culpability created by
a blameworthy mental state (e.g. intent/purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, or negligence) because it imposes punishment
28
based on a result alone. Strict liability is commonly criticized
for attaching the condemnation of a criminal conviction without
29
proof that an individual is morally blameworthy.
The term “voluntary” in criminal law is used in a narrow
sense to exclude only those acts that are the result of a ref lex,
convulsion, hypnosis, etc., or occur during sleep or uncon30
sciousness. In the context of the persecutor bar, however, the
term “voluntary” is used to designate an act performed without
31
outside interference and uncompelled by outside influence. In
this way, voluntariness signals the absence of coercion. Duress—sometimes referred to as compulsion or coercion—is a de-

24. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(a), at 340 (2d
ed. 2003).
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i), (b)(i) (AM. LAW INST. 1985); see also LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 5.2(b), at 342–43.
26. LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 5.2(e), at 352–55; see Carter v. United
States, 530 U.S. 255, 268 (2000) (describing the difference between general
and specific intent).
27. LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 5.3(a), at 358–59.
28. Id. § 5.5, at 381.
29. Id. § 5.5(c), at 390 & n.35. Consequently, the Model Penal Code limits
strict liability offenses to non-criminal regulatory violations “because the condemnatory aspect of a criminal conviction or of a correctional sentence is explicitly precluded.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
30. LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 6.1(c), at 426.
31. Voluntary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); infra Part II.A.
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fense to liability: an individual who “under the pressure of an
unlawful threat from another human being to harm him, commits what would otherwise be a crime may, under some cir32
cumstances, be excused for doing what he did.” The standard
for the duress defense is discussed in Part IV, but it is important to note that duress looks to the nature of the threat and
the ability to escape, among other factors, thereby requiring
more than merely outside interference and influence (e.g. involuntariness) to escape criminal liability. With these basic definitions as background, the Article moves to the current state of
the law.
A. THE EARLY REJECTION OF VOLUNTARINESS IN FEDORENKO V.
UNITED STATES
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the first appearance
of the persecutor bar in U.S. immigration law set the course for
a constrained and unsupported reading over the next twentyfive years. In its 1981 decision in Fedorenko, the Court examined the bar contained in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948
33
(DPA). This Act enabled the over 300,000 European refugees
created by World War II to emigrate to the United States. The
DPA adopted the definitions of “refugees and displaced persons,” along with their exclusions, from the Constitution of the
International Refugee Organization (IRO), an entity created by
the United Nations to support and resettle nearly a million in34
dividuals displaced after the war. The case arose out of the
35
denaturalization action against Feodor Fedorenko. Fedorenko
32. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 9.7, at 72 (2d ed.
2003).
33. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009
(1948); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 493 (1981).
34. See infra Part II.A.
35. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 493. The Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 required United States attorneys to institute proceedings to revoke the
order admitting a person to citizenship and cancelling the certificate of naturalization where “the order and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.” Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, sec. 340(a), 66 Stat.
163, 260 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012)). The government brought such an action in district court to strip Fedorenko of his citizenship. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 897 (S.D. Fla. 1978),
rev’d, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff ’d, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). In the late
1970s, the U.S. government began efforts to find and prosecute former Nazi
persecutors who had immigrated to the United States after World War II. See
ALLAN A. RYAN, QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN
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was born in the Ukraine and was drafted into the Russian army in World War II. He was then captured by the Germans and
36
taken as a prisoner of war. As a POW, Fedorenko was trained
to be a concentration camp guard and stationed at the camp in
37
Treblinka, Poland. Fedorenko failed to disclose that he had
served as an armed guard at Treblinka when he obtained a visa
to enter the United States under the DPA. He was admitted to
the United States as a permanent resident in 1949 and became
a citizen in 1970.
The Court granted certiorari to clarify the standard for
when a factual misrepresentation would support revocation of
38
an immigrant’s citizenship. In the end, though, the Court did
39
not decide the question. Instead, the Court held that
Fedorenko was ineligible for a visa under the DPA’s persecutor
40
bar. Thus, according to the Court, Fedorenko’s citizenship was

AMERICA 7–28 (1984).
36. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 494.
37. Id. at 493. The facts in Fedorenko align with historical scholarship on
the experiences of prisoners of war who were captured by Nazi forces. See Peter Black, Foot Soldiers of the Final Solution: The Trawniki Training Camp
and Operation Reinhard, 25 HOLOCAUST & GENOCIDE STUD. 1, 1–9 (2011)
(discussing the Trawniki Training Camp where the “Trawniki men,” largely of
Ukrainian origin, were trained to serve as guards for killing centers and labor
camps established by Operation Reinhard and were generally able to choose
whether to enter these units).
38. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 493; Brief for Petitioner at 2–3, Fedorenko v.
United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) (No. 79-5602), 1980 WL 339957, at *11;
Brief for the Respondent at 1, Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981)
(No. 79-5602), 1980 WL 339958, at *17. The Supreme Court’s earlier decision
in Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960), required the government to
show by clear and convincing evidence that the misrepresentation was “material.” Chaunt provided that facts are material when (1) “if known, [they] would
have warranted denial of citizenship”; or (2) “their disclosure might have been
useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship.” 364 U.S. at 355. The dispute over the standard
centered on whether the government had to prove that an investigation definitively would have revealed facts warranting a denial of citizenship, as the District Court concluded, or that an investigation might have uncovered facts
warranting a denial of citizenship, as the Fifth Circuit ruled. See Fedorenko,
449 U.S. at 502–04; United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir.
1979); Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 916–18.
39. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 516, 518 n.40.
40. Id. at 507, 514–16. “Any person who shall willfully make a misrepresentation for the purpose of gaining admission into the United States as an
eligible displaced person shall thereafter not be admissible into the United
States.” Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62 Stat. 1009,
1013 (1948). The Court determined that Fedorenko would not have been
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“illegally procured” because he had failed to meet the statutory
prerequisites of being admitted as a lawful permanent resident
41
on the basis of a valid visa.
The Court arrived at its interpretation of the DPA’s persecutor bar by comparing the text of two related exclusionary
42
provisions adopted from the Constitution of the IRO : one
which barred anyone who “assisted the enemy in persecuting
civil populations of countries” that are Members of the United
43
Nations (the persecutor bar), and the other barring anyone
who “voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak
of the second world war in their operations against the United
44
Nations.” The Court reasoned that because the exclusion for
military activities was limited to those who “voluntarily assisted the enemy forces,” the persecutor bar “made all those who
assisted in the persecution of civilians ineligible for visas,”
45
whether that assistance was voluntary or involuntary.
46
At this point, the Court added a footnote, which has
prompted years of scrutiny by adjudicators attempting to de47
fine the persecutor bar’s scope. The footnote states that the

granted a DPA visa under the persecutor bar if he had disclosed his service as
an armed concentration camp guard and therefore his misrepresentation was
material and his visa invalid. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 507–09.
41. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 507, 514–15 (explaining that “our cases have
established that a naturalized citizen’s failure to comply with the statutory
prerequisites for naturalization renders his certificate of citizenship revocable
as ‘illegally procured’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)” and that the DPA’s provisions
concerning the persecutor bar and material misrepresentations rendered the
visa on which his naturalization was premised invalid).
42. Displaced Persons Act § 2(b); see also David Birnbaum, Denaturalization and Deportation of Nazi War Criminals in the United States: Upholding
Constitutional Principles in a Single Proceeding, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 201, 206–09 (1989) (discussing the history and adoption of the DPA
and subsequent cases involving the denaturalization of Nazi war criminals).
The IRO Constitution, appearing at 62 Stat. 3037–55, was ratified by the
United States on December 16, 1946, and became effective on August 20, 1948.
See T. I. A. S. No. 1846, 62 Stat. 3037 (1948); see also infra Part II (discussing
the creation of the IRO).
43. Displaced Persons Act § 2(a).
44. Id. § 10 (emphasis added) (incorporating Annex I of the IRO Constitution and replicated at 62 Stat. 3051–52).
45. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512.
46. Id. at 512 n.34.
47. Brief for Petitioner, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (No. 07499), 2008 WL 2445504, at *13; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Support of Petitioner, Negusie
v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2550609; Brief Amicus
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prisoners forced to deceive Jews about the purpose of the Treblinka camp “cannot be found to have assisted in the persecu48
tion of civilians.” It contrasted these individuals—whose actions included playing in an orchestra at the entrance to the
camp to welcome incoming prisoners, wearing Red Cross arm
bands, leading prisoners from the trains to a building disguised
as a lazaret, cutting the hair of women prisoners before taking
them to a gas chamber labeled as a bath, and undressing old
and infirm prisoners about to be killed—with Fedorenko, who
“was issued a uniform and armed with a rifle and a pistol, who
was paid a stipend and was regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp to visit a nearby village, and who admitted to
shooting at escaping inmates on orders from the commandant
49
of the camp.” Though the Court attempted to separate the victims of persecution from their persecutors through the term
“persecution,” the Court acknowledged that other cases could
50
present “more difficult line-drawing problems.”
The Court arrived at its conclusion regarding the bar for
involuntary conduct despite the fact that the government did
not assert this view. While the Court’s decision turned on the
text of the persecutor bar in the DPA, the parties’ briefing did
not. In its brief to the Fifth Circuit, the government stated that
“in this case” it “had no quarrel” with the district court’s interpretation, in which it required voluntariness for the bar to ap51
ply. And then when addressing the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General assumed arguendo that the question of whether
Fedorenko’s service as a guard was compelled was relevant to
52
the application of the DPA’s persecutor bar.
Curiae of the Advocates for Human Rights in Support of Petitioner, Negusie v.
Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2550608; see also Dienstag,
supra note 16, at 128–32; Massey, supra note 16, at 97.
48. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34. These activities were discussed by
the prisoner-laborers who had escaped Treblinka and testified against
Fedorenko in the District Court. See United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp.
893, 902 n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev’d, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff ’d, 449
U.S. 490 (1981).
49. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 513 n.34.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 513 n.35; id. at 536 nn.8–9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 38, at *35. In the government’s
view, the question presented as to Chaunt’s materiality test turned on whether the standard was that the disclosure of the true facts would have led to an
investigation that might have revealed facts warranting a denial of citizenship
or if the true facts would have led to an investigation that would have revealed facts warranting a denial of citizenship. Id. at *23. Because the gov-
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The Court relied heavily on the testimony of Officer Kemp53
ton Jenkins to support its statutory analysis. Officer Jenkins
had served as a vice consul in the U.S. Foreign Service and reviewed approximately 5000 visa applications under the DPA
54
from displaced persons and refugees receiving IRO services.
He testified that he knew of no camp guards granted visas under the Act, but also admitted he remembered only three cases
55
involving guards. He explained that the vice-consuls considered involuntary camp guard service to be an inherent contradiction in terms because no guard ever attempted to convince
56
the vice-consuls that his service had been involuntary. Rather,
he stated that former guards invariably admitted that they had
chosen to become a guard because the conditions were more
57
comfortable than in the forced labor divisions. Consequently,
ernment advocated for the first interpretation, it would prevail under the correct interpretation of Chaunt regardless of whether the statute permitted an
exception for involuntary assistance: either way the true facts would have led
to an inquiry that might have resulted in denial. Id. at *42; see also Fedorenko,
449 U.S at 536 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Attorney General
himself argued the case and presuming that “the decision not to question the
District Court’s construction of the statute was reached only after the matter
had been reviewed with the utmost care”).
53. The Court described Jenkins as “particularly well informed about the
practice concerning the eligibility of former camp guards for DPA visas.”
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 511.
54. Id. at 496–99, 496 n.5. Countries willing to resettle refugees and displaced persons negotiated individual agreements with the IRO addressing the
country’s standards for accepting someone, post-resettlement conditions, legal
status of refugee immigrants, and selection procedures. Candidates for resettlement in a particular country were initially screened by IRO personnel and
then given to the country missions for selection based on that country’s personal, occupational, and physical criteria. Exec. Sec’y of Preparatory Comm’n,
Report to the General Council of the International Refugee Organization, at
33–36 (Sept. 1948).
55. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 912 (S.D. Fla. 1978),
rev’d, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff ’d, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
56. United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 952 (5th Cir. 1979), aff ’d,
449 U.S. 490 (1981); see also Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 510 n.32 (stating that he
could not conceive of the “hypothetical situation” in which a concentration
camp guard was there involuntarily); Brief for the Respondent, supra note 38,
at *42 n.31 (citing Jenkins’s testimony that in his opinion there were no involuntary concentration camp guards).
57. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d at 952. This perception coincides with more recent scholarship on the origins and circumstances of the auxiliary forces used
to operate the concentration camps. See Black, supra note 37, at 1–15, 38
(2011) (describing how after the spring of 1942 many Soviet POWs chose to
serve as concentration camp guards to escape forced labor and to receive the
benefits and freedoms of serving as a policeman; these freedoms included be-
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he testified that guards were ineligible for visas under both the
persecutor bar and the bar for those who had voluntarily as58
sisted enemy forces. He explained that he would have also
considered the kapos, the Jewish prisoners who supervised
Jewish workers in the camp, to be excluded from the benefits of
the DPA because of their assistance to the Nazis in supervising
59
the activities of other Jewish prisoners. Yet, Officer Jenkins
acknowledged that it was difficult to determine whether the evidence in a particular inmate’s case justified a determination
that he collaborated with his persecutors, that he had not handled a case involving this kind of applicant, and that he did not
know of any specific case in which a kapo was in fact denied a
60
visa.
The Court’s departure from the question presented resulted in a fractured decision. Chief Justice Burger concurred in
the judgment only; Justice Blackmun wrote separately to re61
solve the materiality standard. Justice White dissented, stating that the DPA’s persecutor bar is “not entirely unambiguous,
and the parties have not addressed the proper interpretation of
62
the statute.” He explained that “the words ‘assist’ and ‘persecute’ suggest that [the bar] would not apply to an individual
63
whose actions were truly coerced.” Justice Stevens dissented
separately. He described the course of the litigation as “depressing,” resulting in a decision founded “on a theory that no
litigant argued, that the Government expressly disavowed, and
that may jeopardize the citizenship of countless survivors of
64
Nazi concentration camps.” Ultimately, he predicted that
65
“human suffering will be the consequence of today’s venture.”
According to Justice Stevens, the Court’s footnoted attempt
to distinguish victims from their persecutors also floundered in
its foundation. The Court’s identification of Fedorenko’s uniform, weapon, pay, leave time, and service recognition as features distinguishing him from the camp inmates had nothing to

ing paid and being able to seek reassignment).
58. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 38, at *41 n.31.
59. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 510 n.32; id. at 534 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 913.
60. Brief for Respondent, supra note 38, at *41 n.31.
61. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 518.
62. Id. at 527 (White, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 527 n.3.
64. Id. at 530 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 538.
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66

do with the term “persecution.” However, the acts committed
by working prisoners at Treblinka undoubtedly did contribute
to the persecution carried out there. A survivor of Treblinka
who testified against Fedorenko, when asked if he “assist[ed] in
bringing [prisoners] to their death,” stated, “We automatically
67
assisted, all of us, but . . . it was under the fear and terror.”
The majority’s footnote, said Justice Stevens, thus ignored the
contributions of coerced prisoners, which were similar to the
acts of the guards, and relied instead on facts unrelated to the
68
term “persecution” to try to draw difficult lines.
Despite the opinions by the other Justices, the majority
stated that all those who assisted in the persecution of civilians
were excluded by the bar contained in the DPA and provided
little guidance as to how to separate the persecuted from the
persecutors where the nature of the persecution merged the
69
two.
Alongside Justice Stevens, commentators have likewise
criticized the Court’s superficial approach to statutory interpretation at the expense of a more considered review of policy
trade-offs and principles of liability. Stephen Massey, writing
soon after the Fedorenko decision, faulted the Court’s analysis
for relying on congressional intent unsupported by legislative
history, failing to consider a portion of the DPA that created
significant ambiguity as to the requirement for voluntariness,
and ignoring the moral judgments implicit in the Court’s opin70
ion.
In the wake of the decision, Massey suggested a framework
for lower courts to use to administer the persecutor bar in the
context of the denaturalization proceedings of other alleged
Nazi collaborators. Fedorenko removed voluntariness and coercion from consideration, which Massey questioned, but following Fedorenko, he too excluded these concerns from his analy71
sis. Consequently, his framework—derived from the work of
moral philosophers—focused on how to attribute individual responsibility for the harms caused by a collective without con66. Id. at 535 n.6.
67. Id. at 534 n.4.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 509–10 (majority opinion).
70. Massey, supra note 16, at 112–16; see also Dienstag, supra note 16, at
128–32 (criticizing the mechanical analysis of the Court that ignored the jurisprudential considerations of denying protection based on coerced acts).
71. Massey, supra note 16, at 112–16, 143–44.
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sidering the effect of threats and the ability to choose not to
harm others in measuring that responsibility. Massey asserted
that moral responsibility, and thus the persecutor bar, should
attach when an individual makes more than a minimal contribution to a group that he knows has as its objective the perse72
cution of civilians. An individual’s contribution, in turn,
should be measured by the degree of initiative required, the
complexity of the task assigned, the closeness of the connection
between the individual’s task and the harm caused, the degree
of authority given to the individual, and the collective’s estimation of the contribution as demonstrated through wages and
73
privileges provided to the individual. Under this rubric, membership alone, in an organization that had the persecution of
others as one of its objectives, is too small a contribution to
74
trigger individual responsibility for the group’s actions. Massey’s framework for moral responsibility, however, does not account for individuals who make substantial contributions to a
group knowing that the group’s goal is to persecute, but do so
only under extreme coercion. His framework can guide courts
in answering the question of what kind of participation makes
an individual culpable for the harm caused by a collective. But
it does not measure culpability when an individual’s contribution is undisputed but his ability to avoid contributing to collective harm is. The Supreme Court later recognized the potential
overbreadth of its position in Fedorenko, but not before the BIA
went even further in disregarding traditional indicia of culpability including one of Massey’s key factors for moral responsibility: knowledge that one’s acts contribute to the harm of others.
B. THE AGENCY ADDS STRICT LIABILITY
With the Supreme Court’s sweeping statements as to the
bar’s reach, the BIA took over the role as interpreter and arrived at an even more severe view to create a form of strict liability. It crafted a rule that looks only to the “objective effects”
of an individual’s actions, not his intent, level of participation,
ability to avoid harming others, nor even his knowledge of the
effect of his actions.

72. Id. at 98.
73. Id. at 145–47.
74. Id. at 147.
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Two years after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Fedorenko, the BIA considered the deportability of a Latvian
Political Police officer whose unit operated under the direction
of the Nazi government during its occupation of Latvia from
75
1941 until 1945. Edgar Laipenieks voluntarily joined this
76
force in order to identify members of the Communist Party.
He testified that his responsibilities were limited to identifying
77
and interrogating suspected communists, but he acknowledged that the results of his investigations were used by his
supervisors to make decisions about whether those individuals
would be detained and beaten in the local prison, killed, or
78
transferred to a concentration camp. Despite rising through
the ranks of the Latvian Political Police, the German directors
eventually permitted him to leave, providing him with a certifi79
cate of great service upon his departure.
The case required the BIA to construe a ground of deportability created by the Holtzman Amendment, which applied to
any noncitizen who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the persecution of any person because of race,
80
religion, national origin, or political opinion.” Applying
Fedorenko, the BIA concluded that because Congress omitted a
voluntariness requirement in the DPA’s persecutor bar and had
considered the DPA when it enacted the amendment in 1978,
Congress did not intend to include “an intent element” in the
81
deportability ground. Thus, an individual’s “particular motivations or intent . . . [were] not a relevant factor” to the scope of
82
the statute. The BIA then considered the Court’s discussion of
the need to “focus[] on whether particular conduct can be con83
sidered assisting in the persecution of civilians.” It determined
that because intent was immaterial, the BIA must look to the
84
“objective effect” of an individual’s actions. Laipenieks had
75. In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 434–36 (B.I.A. 1983), rev’d,
Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).
76. Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 449.
77. Id. at 450–51.
78. Id. at 452, 458.
79. Id. at 453.
80. Id. at 454, 463 (construing the Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 241(a)(19)); see also Part III infra (discussing the history of this provision).
81. Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 464.
82. Id.
83. Id. (providing broader emphasis than the emphasis provided by the
Supreme Court in Fedorenko’s note 34).
84. Id. at 465 (emphasizing that an objective approach must be used in
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participated in the arrest, detention, and interrogation of political prisoners and communicated with Nazi officials about the
political activities of these prisoners, the objective effects of
which led to their beatings and killings. The BIA concluded
that Laipenieks had therefore assisted in the persecution of
85
others and was deportable.
Next, the BIA applied its objective-effects test from In re
Laipenieks to Fedorenko himself in the deportation proceedings
86
that followed his denaturalization. In In re Fedorenko, the
BIA accepted the district court’s findings that Fedorenko’s service as an armed guard at Treblinka had been involuntary and
that Fedorenko had not personally committed any of the atroci87
ties carried out there. The BIA concluded, though, that under
its rule that “motivation and intent are irrelevant . . . and that
it is the objective effect of an alien’s actions which is control88
ling,” Fedorenko was deportable. The effect of his conduct as a
perimeter guard would have aided the Nazis “in some small
measure” in their confinement and execution of Jewish prison89
ers and consequently he had assisted in their persecution.
Recognizing that its rule may lead to “harsh or inequitable” results, the BIA explained that “it was Congress’s intent that all
who assisted the Nazis in persecuting others must be deported,
90
and [the BIA] must comply with that intent.”
91
In In re Rodriguez-Majano, the BIA applied its rule again,
but this time to the bar for asylum and withholding of removal
92
contained in the Refugee Act of 1980. In 1983, RodriguezMajano was working for his father’s cattle business in El Salvador when his uncle and cousin were kidnapped and killed,
this context).
85. Id. at 465–66.
86. In re Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57 (B.I.A. 1984); see Matthew
Lippman, The Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United States and in Other Anglo-American Legal Systems, 29 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1 (Fall 1998) (discussing the United States’ approach to imposing liability for Nazi war crimes
through denaturalization then deportation as compared to other Anglo-Saxon
countries—such as Canada and Australia—which created provisions in their
national law that imposed criminal liability). Fedorenko was ultimately deported to the Soviet Union and executed.
87. Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 68–69 & nn. 5–6.
88. Id. at 69.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 70 (emphasizing that anyone who helped Nazis in persecution
related activities is subject to deportation).
91. In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811 (B.I.A. 1988).
92. Id. at 811. For discussion of the Refugee’s Act, see infra Part III.
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reportedly by government forces, because they had been active
93
in the guerrillas. Guerrillas later captured Rodriguez-Majano
and commandeered several of his trucks, forcing him to
transport guerilla supplies. He was released and then taken by
the guerrillas again, escaping after two months. Soon after fleeing the guerrillas, government forces arrested and tortured
him; he was eventually cleared of charges of collaboration and
94
told to leave the country. Citing the Supreme Court in
Fedorenko, the BIA stated that the “participation or assistance
of an alien in persecution need not be of his own volition to bar
95
him from relief.”
With the BIA’s conclusion that any contribution to the persecution of others, regardless of knowledge or circumstance,
barred an individual from protection against his own persecution, the issue returned to the Supreme Court in 2009 in
Negusie v. Holder. This time, however, the Court had the
benefit of the considerable administrative law jurisprudence it
developed in the interim.
C. THE COURT’S CALL TO REINTERPRET THE PERSECUTOR BAR
IN NEGUSIE V. HOLDER
In Negusie v. Holder, the Court was again faced with the
96
scope of the persecutor bar as it appeared in the Refugee Act.
Negusie, a dual national of Eritrea and Ethiopia, was con97
scripted by Eritrean officials to fight against Ethiopia. When
Negusie refused, he was imprisoned, beaten, and forced to
98
serve as an armed guard of other prisoners in the same camp.
He testified that as a guard he prevented the prisoners’ escape,
kept them in the sun knowing it could cause death, and pre99
vented them from showering or getting fresh air. Negusie also
testified that he never shot at anyone or directly punished any-

93. Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 813.
94. Id. at 813–14.
95. Id. at 814. But it determined that Rodriguez-Majano was not disqualified from refugee protection as a forced conscript of a Salvadoran guerrilla
group because the “objective effects” of his acts had contributed to the general
civil war and not the persecution of others on account of a protected ground.
Id. at 815–16.
96. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
97. Id. at 514.
98. Id. at 515.
99. Id.
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one and that he had helped prisoners when he could. He escaped after four years, swimming to a ship and hiding inside
101
one of the containers. The container eventually arrived to the
United States, where he filed applications for asylum and
102
withholding of removal.
The underlying litigation and Supreme Court briefing
placed in stark relief the troublesome consequences of the BIA’s
interpretation of the persecutor bar and the humanitarian suffering Justice Stevens predicted. The BIA had applied its rule
to conclude that Negusie’s compelled service was immaterial
and that the objective effects of his actions assisted the perse103
cution of the other prisoners. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, cit104
ing the Supreme Court’s holding in Fedorenko. In support of
Negusie’s challenge, the U.N. and national advocacy groups informed the Court that victims of persecution are commonly
forced by their persecutors to participate in the persecution of
others, arguing that the BIA’s rule was inconsistent with the
United States’ international obligations, with the purpose of
the Refugee Act, and with the line drawing in Fedorenko it105
self.
Forced to contend with the Court’s prior interpretation in
Fedorenko that all those who had assisted the enemy in the
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 516.
104. Id.
105. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees in Support of Petitioner, supra note 47, at *5 (discussing the United States’ international obligations under the 1967 Protocol);
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Advocates for Human Rights in Support of Petitioner, supra note 47 (discussing Fedorenko); Brief Amici Curiae of the American Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Committee in Support of Petitioner at 22, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (No. 07-449), 2008 WL
2468542, at *22 (discussing international obligations, the Refugee Act, and
Fedorenko); Brief Amici Curiae of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and
16 Religious and Religious Freedom Organizations in Support of Petitioner at
3, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2550607, at
*3 (discussing the history of authoritarian governments forcing participation
in persecution); see also Brief for Scholars of International Refugee Law as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, 13, 24, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S.
511 (2009) (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2550611, at *6, *13, *24; Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights First, American Immigration Lawyers Association, Human
Rights Watch, and U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants in Support of
Petitioner at 11, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (No. 07-499), 2008 WL
2597010, at *11.
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persecution of civilian populations—voluntarily or not—were
106
excluded from the United States, the Negusie Court described
the Fedorenko decision as excluding “even those involved in
107
nonculpable, involuntary assistance in Nazi persecution.”
However, the Court broke with Fedorenko and reversed
and remanded the case, determining that the Refugee Act’s silence on whether compulsion or duress is relevant to the persecutor bar creates an ambiguity that must be interpreted first
by the BIA under the principles governing judicial deference to
agency interpretations, as announced in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
108
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. The Court concluded
that its prior holding in Fedorenko that “voluntariness was not
required with respect to another persecutor bar” did not control
because the Refugee Act and DPA were adopted for different
purposes and the Refugee Act did not contain the same statutory structure in which the word “voluntarily” was used in one
109
provision and omitted from a parallel one. The Court concluded that the BIA had not exercised its interpretive authority, but instead reflexively applied its interpretation of the
110
Court’s decision in Fedorenko.
The Court left to the BIA to decide “[w]hatever weight or
relevance” the DPA, Fedorenko, and international refugee
agreements may have in interpreting the persecutor bar con111
tained in the Refugee Act. But the Court clarified that, in arriving at its interpretation, the agency could reconsider the rel112
evance of “motive and intent” as well as “voluntariness.”
Each of the three separate Negusie opinions propose the
answer the BIA should supply. Justice Thomas dissented in
full. He determined that the persecutor bar contained in the
Refugee Act was based on the similar exclusion in the DPA,
and that, in 1996, Congress reenacted the bar from the Refugee
113
Act aware of the Court’s interpretation in Fedorenko. Conse106. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 519; Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490,
512 (1981) (“[T]he deliberate omission of the word ‘voluntary’ from § 2(a) compels the conclusion that the statute made all those who assisted in the persecution of civilians ineligible for visas.”).
107. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 520.
108. Id. at 533–35; INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002); Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
109. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 518–19.
110. Id. at 520–23.
111. Id. at 520.
112. Id. at 523–24.
113. Id. at 547–48.
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quently, he contends that just as the DPA’s persecutor bar was
114
not limited to voluntary conduct, neither is the Refugee Act’s.
Justices Scalia and Alito concurred but clarified that the Board
would be reasonable in concluding that the persecutor bar does
115
not permit a duress defense. They stated that as a discretionary matter, coerced persecutors may be “undesirable as immi116
grants” and that a “bright-line rule excluding all persecutors”
117
could be preferable. These Justices suggest that while the
agency may want to revise its interpretation to require
knowledge of the consequences of one’s acts for the bar to apply,
118
it should reject an exception for duress. Justices Stevens and
Breyer concluded that the statute does not disqualify an immigrant whose conduct was coerced or the product of duress. These Justices rely on the various international agreements informing the Refugee Act and their interpretations by the
119
United Nations and other Member States. Otherwise, in their
view, the statute would impermissibly “treat entire classes of
120
victims as persecutors.”
After nearly thirty years of decision-making, the agency is
left with the conclusion that the meaning of “persecution” in
the bar is ambiguous and must be construed first by the agen121
cy. With Chevron succeeding Fedorenko, and the use of the
same ambiguous terms in the DPA, the agency can depart from
122
Fedorenko’s rule as well. By doing so, the immigration agency
could incorporate fundamental principles of liability, as described by Massey and others, in its administration of the persecutor bar. Although the Justices vary on the domestic and international sources of law that bear on the bar’s interpretation,

114. Id. at 548.
115. Id. at 525.
116. Id. at 527; see also Dienstag, supra note 16, at 128–32 (discussing the
Supreme Court’s rationale in Fedorenko and the implications of the ruling);
Massey, supra note 16, at 102 n.25 (noting that State Department officials in
past cases have testified that they have the discretion to deny a visa to any
immigrant who is not desirable).
117. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 527.
118. Id. at 528.
119. Id. at 535–38.
120. Id. at 535.
121. Id. at 524.
122. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 969 (2005) (providing that an agency can interpret a statute differently from a prior judicial construction so long as the statute’s terms are ambiguous and the agency’s divergent reading is reasonable).
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it is clear that the agency must consider their “weight and relevance” in issuing its final rule. It is to these sources that the
Article turns next.
II. RESURRECTING THE CULPABILITY REQUIREMENT
IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE ORGANIZATION
Fedorenko examined the Displaced Persons Act of 1948,
which incorporated wholesale the eligibility provisions of the
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization
123
(IRO). The Fedorenko Court cited the use of the word “voluntarily” in one IRO exclusion but not a parallel exclusion as indicia of congressional intent, and it relied on the testimony of one
Foreign Service officer regarding the administration of the persecution-related exclusion. Original documents reveal that neither source provides the full story.
The drafting history of the IRO’s Constitution illustrates
two key elements of the drafters’ intent: an attempt to limit the
number of individuals forced to return to their countries of
origin (many of whom had fallen under communist control),
and an understanding that the term “persecution” inherently
requires willful action. Moreover, the eligibility directives given
to IRO adjudicators and the decisions by an appellate review
board reflect a far more nuanced application of the persecutor
bar than that described in the Foreign Service officer’s testimony. In this Part, I examine the drafting history of the IRO,
the IRO Eligibility Directive and Eligibility Manuals, and the
decisions of the IRO Eligibility Review Board. I contend that, in
the absence of this history, both the Fedorenko Court and the
BIA arrived at too broad a rule—one that excludes individuals
who were never considered potential persecutors by the IRO.
Rather, the first adjudicators of the persecutor bar treated the
victims of Nazi persecution entirely apart from its perpetrators.
They also looked for indicia of culpability—in the form of direct
action, a position of authority, or membership in a persecutory
group with no evidence of individual innocence of that group’s
actions.
Fedorenko’s broad conception of the original persecutor bar
in U.S. law rested on the use of the terms “voluntarily” and
123. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 495 (1981); see also Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 2(b), 62 Stat. 1009, 1009
(1948).
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“persecution” in the IRO Constitution, as adopted in the DPA.
The Court looked at neither the drafting history nor the historical context when construing these terms and therefore missed
the significance of both. The use of the word “voluntarily” in
one exception but not the other turns out to say very little
about the drafters’ conception of the persecutor bar, but instead
reflects the emergence of Cold War politics and a fight between
Eastern and Western countries over whether to protect or punish political dissidents. As such, the IRO provision concerning
voluntary assistance serves as a faulty foil for the Court’s analysis of the persecutor bar in Fedorenko. More relevant to the
bar’s meaning in the IRO Constitution, and thus the DPA, was
the contemporary understanding of the term “persecution.”
Section A uncovers the source of the term “voluntarily” and the
meaning of “persecution” in order to supply the context that
was missing in Fedorenko. In the end, though, the bar’s original
scope is illuminated more by its application than by its terms.
Section B addresses the evidence of how the bar was applied to
victims of persecution and its perpetrators.
A. THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TERMS
“VOLUNTARILY” AND “PERSECUTION”
After World War II, there were approximately 8,000,000
people living outside their countries of nationality or places of
124
residence. Many millions repatriated but at the end of 1946,
there were still about 1,600,000 refugees throughout the world
125
who did not want to return to their prior homes. In response
to the unprecedented magnitude of the refugee population, the
General Assembly of the United Nations created the International Refugee Organization (IRO) to repatriate, resettle, and
126
provide basic services to refugees and displaced persons. Its
127
mission was fundamentally humanitarian, and its creation
128
and operation was led by the United States.

124. Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], The Facts about Refugees, at 2 (1948) [hereinafter IRO Facts].
125. Id. at 4; HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 1 (estimating 1.5 million people).
126. IRO CONST. annex III, reprinted in 18 U.N., TREATY SERIES: TREATIES
AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS REGISTERED OR FILED AND RECORDED
WITH THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 23–24 (1948); G.A. Res. 283,
U.N. Doc. A/45 (Feb. 12, 1946), reprinted in U.N., supra, at 23–24; HOLBORN,
supra note 16, at 33.
127. HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 53.
128. See GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS:
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The IRO was established through a resolution proposed by
129
the United States. The resolution required an organization to
separate the victims of World War II from its perpetrators. It
began by “[r]ecognizing that the problem of refugees and displaced persons of all categories is one of immediate urgency
and recognizing the necessity of clearly distinguishing between
genuine refugees and displaced persons on the one hand, and
130
the war criminals, quislings, and traitors, on the other.” The
General Assembly adopted this resolution and recommended
that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) create a special committee to examine the situation and report back to the
131
Assembly. To protect victims of persecution, the resolution
provided the special committee with a guiding principle that no
refugee or displaced person with “valid objections” shall be
“compelled to return to their countries of origin” and that the
future of these persons “shall become the concern” of an inter132
national body created by the special committee. In contrast,
with respect to perpetuators of harm, the resolution provides
that no action should be taken that would “interfere in any way
with the surrender and punishment of war criminals, quislings
and traitors, in conformity with present or future international
133
arrangements or agreements.”
134
A drafting committee was formed and met for nearly two
135
months to create the Constitution for the IRO. The result was
an international body that would provide services and protection to individuals who qualified under a series of definitions
REFUGEES AND AMERICA’S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 14–16
(1986) (describing the United States’ hostility to the IRO’s precursor, the
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), for its
pro-Soviet position and outlining the Truman administration’s efforts to replace UNRRA with the Western-dominated IRO).
129. HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 31–33.
130. G.A. Res. 283, supra note 126. A quisling is a “traitor who collaborates
with an enemy force occupying their country.” Quisling, OXFORD DICTIONARY
OF ENGLISH 1145 (Angus Stevenson ed., 3d ed. 2010). The term originated
from the name of Major Vidkun Quisling (1887–1945), the Norwegian army
officer and diplomat who ruled Norway on behalf of the German occupying
forces from 1940–1945. Id.
131. Id. ¶ (b).
132. Id. ¶ (c)(ii).
133. Id. ¶ (d).
134. Economic and Social Council Res. 1/3, U.N. Doc. E/Res/5, ¶ 32(1)(b)
(Feb. 16, 1946).
135. Econ. & Soc. Council, Rep. of the Special Comm. on Refugees and Displaced Persons, at 1–5, U.N. Doc. E/Ref/75 (June 1, 1946).
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136

and bars. The foundational requirement for these benefits
was status as a “refugee” or “displaced person.” The Constitution defined the term “refugee” using four different categories:
(1) individuals outside their former home countries who were
victims of the Nazi regime or collaborating regimes, victims of
the Falangist regime in Spain, or persons considered refugees
before World War II; (2) a person outside his home country who
is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
government; (3) German or Austrian Jews who were victims of
Nazi persecution, who are living in Germany or Austria but
have not firmly resettled; or (4) unaccompanied children who
137
are war orphans and outside their countries of origin. The
term “displaced person” applied to an individual who, through
actions of a Nazi or fascist regime, “has been deported from, or
has been obliged to leave his country of nationality or former
habitual residence, such as persons who were compelled to undertake forced labour or who were deported for racial, religious
138
or political reasons.”
136. Id. at 3.
137. IRO CONST. annex I, pt. I, § A, reprinted in U.N., supra note 126, at
18. More specifically, the text provided:
1. . . . [A] person who has left, or who is outside of, his country of nationality or of former habitual residence, and who . . . belongs to one
of the following categories:
(a) [V]ictims of the [N]azi or fascist regimes or of regimes which
took part on their side in the second world war, or of the quisling
or similar regimes which assisted them against the United Nations, whether enjoying international status as refugees or not;
(b) Spanish Republicans and other victims of the Falangist regime in Spain, whether enjoying international status as refugees
or not;
(c) [P]ersons who were considered refugees before the outbreak of
the second world war, for reasons of race, religion, nationality or
political opinion.
2. . . . [A] person, other than a displaced person . . . who is outside of
his country of nationality or former habitual residence, and who, as a
result of events subsequent to the outbreak of the second world war,
is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the Government of his country of nationality or former nationality.
3. . . . [P]ersons who, having resided in Germany or Austria, and being of Jewish origin or foreigners or stateless persons, were victims of
[N]azi persecution and were detained in, or were obliged to flee from,
and were subsequently returned to, one of those countries as a result
of enemy action, or of war circumstances, and have not yet been firmly resettled therein.
4. . . . [U]naccompanied children who are war orphans or whose parents have disappeared, and who are outside their countries of origin.
Id.
138. Id. annex I, pt. I, § B.
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Not all refugees and displaced persons were eligible for
services, however. Rather, only those refugees and displaced
persons who were “the concern of the Organization” could qualify. A refugee or displaced person fell within this group if she
could be repatriated but needed assistance from the IRO to do
so, or if she had expressed “valid objections” to returning to her
home country due to “(i) persecution, or fear, based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of race, religion, nationality
or political opinions”; (ii) valid political objections; or (iii) “compelling family reasons arising out of previous persecution, . . .
139
infirmity or illness.” However, the IRO Constitution did not
require Spanish Republicans (and other victims of the
Falangist regime) or Jewish victims of Nazi persecution living
in Germany or Austria to establish a valid objection to returning to Spain or staying in Germany or Austria in order to be140
come a concern of the IRO. These individuals were eligible for
services based on their status as victims alone. Broadly stated,
status as a victim of past persecution by the Nazis or other fascist regimes, fear of future persecution, or family complications
due to past persecution or poor health would meet the requirements for avoiding forced repatriation, and in the case of Jewish Germans or Austrians residing in those countries, past persecution alone would allow for resettlement.
In addition to defining who was included, the IRO Constitution also defined who was excluded. The first version of the
Constitution excluded:
(a) War criminals, quislings and traitors
(b) Any other persons who have voluntarily and actively assisted the
enemy forces since the outbreak of the second world war in their operations against the United Nations or in persecuting the civil popu141
lation.

This formulation of the persecutor bar was brought to the
full drafting committee. Some delegations raised concern over
the inclusion of the words “voluntarily and actively” because
“they posed an impossible standard since no quisling would

139. Id. annex I, pt. I, § C(1).
140. Id. (exempting refugees and displaced persons from the additional requirement of providing a valid objection to be a concern of the IRO); id. ¶ 1(f)
(indicating refugees and displaced persons are the concern of the IRO); id. annex I, pt. I, § A(1)(b), A(3) (defining these groups as refugees).
141. Econ. & Soc. Council, Special Comm. on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Sub-Committee on Definitions: Report of the Chairman, at 22, U.N. Doc.
E/Ref/65 (May 8, 1946).
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admit to having voluntarily or actively assisted the enemy.”
Other delegates were concerned that without this qualification
“persons who had been coerced into service with the Germans
or who had given only passive type of assistance” would be disqualified from IRO services and that “there were great numbers of persons in former enemy-occupied territory who had
143
found themselves in such circumstances.” In response, a new
formulation was adopted that separated participants in persecution of civil populations from participants in enemy forces,
specifying that only voluntary participation in enemy forces
would be a barrier. A specific exclusion for past persecutors
was created and the burden was shifted to the applicant to
show that assistance to the enemy was involuntary:
Any other persons who have assisted the enemy in persecuting the
civil population of any of the United Nations or who have assisted the
enemy forces since the outbreak of the second World War in their operations against the United Nations, unless it can be established that
such assistance was not given voluntarily or was of a purely humani144
tarian or non-military nature.

The use of the word “voluntarily” continued to be the subject of debate as it applied to former soldiers serving in enemy
145
forces. These objections were usually raised by the Soviet del142. Econ. & Soc. Council, Special Comm. on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Summary Record of the Thirty-Fourth and Thirty-Fifth Meetings, at 6,
U.N. Doc. E/Ref/78 (May 20, 1946).
143. Id.
144. Id. The amendment was proposed by the U.K. and Soviet delegates;
however, the Soviet delegate later objected to the “voluntarily” language.
Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. of the Whole on Refugees and Displaced Persons,
Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting, at 4–5, U.N. Doc. E/80 (June 18,
1946). The British delegate noted that the phrase had been inserted with the
agreement of the Soviet delegation “to ensure assistance to those in the occupied countries who had had to assist the enemy indirectly in order to enable
themselves and their families to survive. This was the case of the majority of
the occupied peoples who had continued their civilian occupation as bakers,
doctors, etc., even if that partly involved assistance to the enemy.” Id. at 5.
145. The Ukrainian delegate supported the Soviet faction, asserting that
the word “voluntarily” was unnecessary—stating that “the word ‘collaboration’
implied that the act was a voluntary one and that there could be no question,
therefore of ‘forced collaboration.’” Comm. of the Whole on Refugees and Displaced Persons, supra note 144, at 5. The draft constitution under review did
not contain the word “collaboration,” however. Rather, the Ukrainian representative—using the word “collaboration” instead of “voluntary”—seemed to
be referring to discussions within the General Assembly, which were given to
the drafting committee. See Econ. & Soc. Council, Documents for the Special
Committee on Refugees and Displaces Persons, U.N. Doc. E/Ref/1 (Jan. 28,
1946). These meetings reflected a repeated concern that war criminals and
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egation and often supported by the Yugoslav, Czechoslovakian,
Polish, and Ukrainian delegations. They occurred in the context of a larger divide between these delegations and Western
governments over who would be forced to return to their coun146
tries of origin. These disagreements were most acute in discussions of protection for political dissidents, many of whom
were prisoners of war from Eastern bloc countries, forced to
serve in German units after the Nazi surge of 1941, and who
were hostile to the communist governments put in place in
their home countries after World War II. As the rapporteur for
the Special Committee explained, labor shortages in the refugees’ countries of origin prompted both a desire by these governments to secure the return of all their nationals to their territory, and objections to “subsidiz[ing] indirectly the opponents
147
of the regime they represent.” Eastern governments asserted
that dissidents should be excluded from refugee protection because they were subject to punishment in their home countries
as political enemies, and that they were also encouraging other
148
refugees not to return. As a result, these countries objected to
the word “voluntarily” because it would limit the number of
former soldiers from the Soviet Union and Eastern European
countries who would be ineligible for resettlement under the
IRO Constitution—and thus forced to return to their countries
of origin—to only those soldiers who volunteered to serve in
Nazi forces. The Communist governments of these countries instead wanted all conscripted soldiers to be ineligible for resettlement so that they would be forced to return to their countries of origin. Their objections ultimately proved unsuccessful,
149
however. In the end, the term “voluntarily” was directed at
their “collaborators” did not receive any benefits from the new organization.
Id. at 8–11, 17–23, 46.
146. These delegations asserted the position in the early General Assembly
debates concerning the resolution that created the IRO, that all displaced persons could return home, that those refusing to return to their homes after four
months should not receive international assistance in the camps, and that the
countries of origin should consent to any resettlement of their citizens. See
HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 30–33.
147. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 135, at 3.
148. HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 37–38; Rep. of the Special Comm. on Refugees and Displaced Persons, supra note 135, at 3–4, 14–17.
149. Econ. & Soc. Council, Draft Constitution for the International Refugee
Organization, 3d Sess., 14th mtg., at 93, U.N. Doc. E/161/Rev.2 (Sept. 30,
1946). Individuals who supported the use of force against member governments or served as leaders in opposition movements were, however, excluded.
IRO CONST. annex I, pt. II, ¶ 6(a)–(b), reprinted in U.N., supra note 126, at 21.
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those who assisted enemy forces in their general operations be150
cause many people served in these forces only under “duress.”
Western delegates prevailed in their desire to help these former
soldiers flee what had become Communist countries. As a result of this language, which allowed former soldiers from the
Soviet Union, Poland, and Yugoslavia, along with their families, to escape forced repatriation based on their objections to
the Communist governments now in place there, these countries refused to join the IRO and made no contribution to its
151
operation.
The term “persecution” also played a key role in the IRO
Constitution and was understood at the time to require an element of deliberateness. The IRO Constitution was the first in152
ternational refugee agreement to use the term “persecution.”
“Persecution” appears in three provisions of the IRO Constitu153
tion: as part of the “refugee” definition; as a “valid objection”
154
155
to repatriation; and as a bar to eligibility. The term ap156
peared in the British Aliens Act of 1905. In this statute, Britain protected immigrants who sought admission to avoid “persecution, involving danger of imprisonment or danger to life or
157
limb on account of religious belief.” The term also appeared in
other IRO precursors, such as the writings that informed the
158
League of Nations policies respecting refugees and the 1938
Evian Conference that created the Intergovernmental Commit159
tee on Refugees. In each of these contexts, “persecution” is
150. Rejecting another Soviet effort to delete the word “voluntarily” as it
applied to assisting enemy forces, the French delegation explained that many
people were “forced to serve under duress,” including many French soldiers.
Econ. & Soc. Council, Discussion of Amendments to the Draft Constitution of
the International Refugee Organization, 3d Sess., 13th mtg., at 90, U.N. Doc.
E/161/Rev.2 (Sept. 30, 1946). The U.S. representative agreed “that a guilty
person could make claims of having acted under duress, but this did not imply
that the Organization would accept such claims injudiciously.” Id.
151. See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 128, at 16.
152. Jane McAdam, Rethinking the Origins of ‘Persecution’ in Refugee Law,
25 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 667, 668 (2013).
153. IRO CONST. annex I, pt. I, § A(3), reprinted in U.N., supra note 126, at
18.
154. Id. annex I, pt. I, § C(1)(a)(i).
155. Id. annex I, pt. I, § C(1)(a)(iii).
156. McAdam, supra note 152, at 667–68.
157. Id. at 668 (quoting the Aliens Act 1905, 5 Edw. c. 13, § 1(3)(d) (Gr.
Brit.)).
158. Id. at 667–71.
159. The Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) was estab-
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used to describe a “deliberate policy” or “official measures” with
an “acknowledged aim” to compel Jews or political dissidents to
160
flee. The discussions of persecution and refugee protection
preceding the drafting of the IRO Constitution reflect a common understanding of “persecution” as an intentional policy on
the part of a government aimed at forcing undesirable citizens
161
to flee that country. The drafters of the IRO Constitution not
only built on these agreements using a core term that designated deliberate and willful action, they also explicitly protected
individuals already designated as “refugees” under the prior initiatives by virtue of their persecution, as that term was understood at the time.
In the end, the General Assembly adopted a formulation
that disqualified from services and resettlement:
1. War criminals, quislings and traitors.
2. Any other persons who can be shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of
countries, Members of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the second world war in their operations against the
United Nations.
3. Ordinary criminals who are extraditable by treaty.

162

lished at the Evian Conference in 1938 to “help victims of [N]azi persecution in
Germany and Austria, providing for their legal protection, maintenance and
resettlement.” The International Refugee Organization, 1946–47 U.N.Y.B. 807,
U.N. Sales No. 1947 L18.
160. See McAdam, supra note 152, at 672–73 (discussing the work of Hope
Simpson, R. Jennings, and Louise Holborn).
161. See id. at 672–82.
162. IRO CONST. annex I, pt. II, ¶ 6, reprinted in U.N., supra note 126, at
21. The Constitution contained additional exclusions for:
4. Persons of German ethnic origin, whether German nationals or
members of German minorities in other countries, who:
(a) have been or may be transferred to Germany from other countries;
(b) have been during the second world war, evacuated from Germany to other countries;
(c) have fled from, or into, Germany, or from their places of residence into countries other than Germany in order to avoid falling
into the hands of Allied armies.
5. Persons who are in receipt of financial support and protection from
their country of nationality, unless their country of nationality requests international assistance for them.
6. Persons who, since the end of hostilities in the second world war:
(a) have participated in any organization having as one of its
purposes the overthrow by armed force of the Government of
their country of origin, being a Member of the United Nations; or
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But, without recorded discussion, the General Assembly
included a footnote at the end of section 2(b) that referenced
both “civil populations” from 2(a) and “voluntary assistance”
from 2(b), stating:
Mere continuance of normal and peaceful duties, not performed with
the specif ic purpose of aiding the enemy against the Allies or against
the civil population of territory in enemy occupation, shall not be considered to constitute “voluntary assistance.” Nor shall acts of general
humanity, such as care of wounded or dying, be so considered except
in cases where help of this nature given to enemy nationals could
equally well have been given to Allied nationals and was purposely
163
withheld from them.

Ultimately, the drafters’ use of the word “voluntarily” in one of
the bars for assisting enemy forces but not the other reflected a
geopolitical struggle over former soldiers and political dissidents who were citizens of countries with post-War communist
governments (and who did not want to return to those countries), and the refusal of Western countries to send them back.
Over the objections of the Eastern bloc countries, the word
“voluntarily” was used to ensure that conscripted soldiers and
prisoners of war would not be forced to return to their home
countries if they had political objections to the governments in
place after the war. In contrast, the term “persecution” had already acquired a common meaning from its use in prior refugee
documents. The isolated use of the term “voluntarily” does not
reflect a policy choice to exclude all who assisted in the persecution of others from IRO coverage, regardless of circumstance,
because the term “persecution” already required deliberate, intentional, and direct action. The practice of IRO adjudicators in
administering the bar confirms this view.

the overthrow by armed force of the Government of any other
Member of the United Nations, or have participated in any terrorist organization;
(b) have become leaders of movements hostile to the Government
of their country of origin being a Member of the United Nations
or sponsors of movements encouraging refugees not to return to
their country of origin;
(c) at the time of application for assistance, are in the military or
civil service of a foreign State.
Id.
163. G.A. Res. 62 (I), at 97–98 (Dec. 15, 1946); IRO CONST. annex I, pt. II,
¶ 2(b), reprinted in U.N., supra note 126, at 20. The Constitution provided that
it would come into force when at least fifteen States who were responsible for
seventy-five percent of the operating budget had become parties to the Constitution. Id. art. 18.
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B. A QUEST FOR CULPABILITY BY IRO ADJUDICATORS
Documents preserved in the French National Archive reveal the evolving guidelines for assessing an applicant’s eligibility and the eligibility analysis of individual applications in a
164
selection of cases adjudicated by the IRO. Most significantly,
these sources show that the persecutor bar was not applied to
individuals who were victims of persecution themselves. They
also demonstrate a standard that required indicia of culpability
and allowed individuals to provide exculpatory evidence
demonstrating individual innocence despite their membership
in a unit known to have committed atrocities with a primarily
voluntary membership. Indeed, in many ways, the IRO adjudicators measured individual responsibility for the actions of the
165
group using the criteria Massey suggested.
The IRO Constitution provided for a semi-judicial process
to ensure the impartial and equitable application of the organi-

164. The French National Archive, located in Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, houses
the documents preserved from the IRO. A description of the history of this collection, its contents, and a general index is available in French on the French
National Archive website. ARCHIVES NATIONALES FRANCE, http://www
.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/chan/chan/pdf/AJ43_2009.pdf (last visited
Nov. 4, 2016). Nearly all documents concerning the IRO are in English—the
only exceptions being some letters and a handful of the Eligibility Review
Board decisions. The collection is public but can only be inspected in person. In
June 2014, I reviewed the contents of the following boxes in the Archive: 102–
08, 131–32, 140–49, 169, 184–94, 303, 412, 424–25, 451–52, 457, 476–49, 481–
93, 497, 567–69, 573–74, 650. These boxes contain copies of all of the policy
directives, eligibility decisions in individual cases, meeting summaries, correspondence between IRO leadership, and periodic reports of the IRO’s operations that have been preserved. I photographed every decision, every communication among the leadership or to field officers regarding eligibility, the
periodic operational reports, resolutions taken by the Executive Committee
bearing on eligibility, and the documents discussing the retention of materials
after the close of the IRO. These files are labeled based on the box in which
they were contained in the Archive. Thus, all file names begin with “AJ 43” as
that corresponds to the designation for the IRO collection in the French National Archive. See id. The next number in the file name corresponds to the
box number also referenced in the index. Thus, the file name “AJ # 43 131” indicates that the document was contained in box 131 of the IRO collection. Finally, I numbered each photograph for identification purposes. This Article
includes citation parentheticals to reference the relevant photograph(s) in my
collection. With the expert research assistance of Jordan Hogness, all of the
individual decisions were sorted by the constitutional provision(s) cited in each
decision as the reason the person (or family) was included in or excluded from
the concern of the IRO.
165. Massey, supra note 16, at 98, 145–47.
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166

zation’s mandate and eligibility criteria. This requirement
167
gave rise to the Review Board for Eligibility Appeals. The Review Board served as an independent appellate body that reviewed challenges from persons whom IRO eligibility field of168
ficers deemed not to be the concern of the organization. It
also advised the IRO Director General on larger eligibility
169
questions.
The IRO’s Executive Committee and Eligibility Review
Board issued a series of documents that reflect a requirement
for personal culpability through references to war crimes liability and the use of exculpatory evidence. The IRO leadership issued an Eligibility Directive in June 1947 and Eligibility Man170
uals in 1947, 1949, and 1950. The 1947 Directive is quite
basic and describes the provisions of the IRO Constitution
along with the procedures for processing individual applicants
171
and instructions on the forms to use. The three manuals,
however, provide guidance on the meaning of the IRO provisions and discussion of the activities of different groups associated with the Nazis in order to educate field officers on the
172
particular eligibility issues for applicants from these groups.

166. IRO CONST. annex I, ¶ 2, reprinted in U.N., supra note 126, at 18.
167. Exec. Sec’y of Preparatory Comm’n, supra note 54, at 45; HOLBORN,
supra note 16, at 208.
168. Exec. Sec’y of the Preparatory Comm’n, supra note 54, at 45–46.
169. Id. at 45; Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Constitution of Review Board for
Eligibility Appeals, Doc. GC/65 (Mar. 26, 1949), reprinted in HOLBORN, supra
note 16, at 213; HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 208.
170. HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 207 (providing an explanation of the IRO
manuals); Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Manual for Eligibility Officers, No. 241
(1950) [hereinafter 1950 Manual]; Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Provisional Order
No. 42.1, app. (Aug. 6, 1949) [hereinafter 1949 Manual] (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 148, 185–89) (photo copy on file with author,
43 148 (v.2) 001–252, 43 148 026–49, 43 185–89 001–04); Int’l Refugee Org.
[IRO], Preparatory Comm’n, Provisional Order No. 42, apps. (Dec. 31, 1947)
[hereinafter 1947 Manual] (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 185–89) (photo copy on file with author, 047–93); Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO],
Eligibility Directive PCIRO, FI/3 (June 25, 1947) [hereinafter 1947 Directive]
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 146–47) (photo copy on
file with author, 001–16). The 1950 Manual was cited by the Supreme Court in
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438 n.20 (1987), as providing guidance
regarding the meaning of “refugee” in the U.N. Convention and Protocol as
that term was taken from the IRO Constitution.
171. 1947 Directive, supra note 170.
172. 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 51–106 (discussing activities of various groups by country of origin and eligibility issues for each); HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 207 (explaining that the 1950 Manual includes case excerpts to
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The Manuals of 1949 and 1950 also include case excerpts from
the Review Board to illustrate the application of the various
173
provisions.
Beginning with the Eligibility Manual issued at the end of
1947, the persecutor bar was explained in conjunction with the
exclusion of war criminals. The Manual described the war criminals provision as excluding anyone who committed acts that
174
constituted war crimes under international law. These were
summarized as:
(a) Crimes against peace (i.e. those who have planned aggressive
war).
(b) [V]iolations of the accepted rules of warfare (i.e. murder of prisoners, murder of hostages and other crimes of which there is a list of
about 20).
(c) Crimes against humanity (e.g. internment of civilians in inhuman
175
conditions, extermination of Jews in gas chambers, etc.).

The crimes corresponded to the offenses defined in the
176
Anyone
Charter of the International Military Tribunal.
charged with war crimes was excluded from IRO assistance un177
til the accusing government cleared the charges. Officers
were directed to refer an applicant suspected of criminal activity to the regional IRO headquarters which maintained a com178
plete list of suspects. The Manual explained that “the guiding
rules laid down in respect of war criminals” apply to the additional exclusion for “persons who can be shown . . . to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations” and that the-

serve as guides). The 1949 Manual also included discussion of the eligibility
issues of various groups, which was repeated and updated in the 1950 Manual.
1949 Manual, supra note 170 (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 148) (photo copy on file with author, 119–82).
173. HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 207 (discussing Review Board case excerpts included in the 1950 Manual). Compare Avsic, 93.731, Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 2218 BA-251 (Sept. 3, 1948)
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 478) (photo copy on file
with author, 024–25), with 1949 Manual, supra note 170 (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 148) (photo copy on file with author, 038).
174. 1947 Manual, supra note 170 (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 185–89) (photo copy on file with author, 076).
175. Id.
176. 1 INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 11 (1947).
177. 1947 Manual, supra note 170 (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 185–89) (photo copy on file with author, 076).
178. Id. (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 185–89) (photo copy on file with author, 077).
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se persons’ names generally appear on the United Nations’
179
lists. The Manual stated further that when an individual’s
name does not appear on the United Nations’ lists but “is generally considered by his countrymen as having been guilty of
persecution” and where the eligibility officer “has no reason to
doubt their good faith,” the officer should gather all available
information and consult with the governing authority or re180
gional headquarters before making a decision. The Review
181
Board did not alter this guidance in subsequent editions.
The only example of the application of the persecutor bar
182
provided in the Manuals involved a Slovenian applicant. In
this case, the Review Board consulted the lists created by the
Special Refugee Screening Commission, which was entrusted
by the British government to screen Yugoslav enemy personnel
183
in Italy and Austria. The Commission used the IRO exclusionary grounds to classify individuals and then made those
184
lists available to the Review Board and field officers. The applicant’s name was contained on the Commission’s “black” list
which corresponded to the category of “war criminals, traitors,
185
or Quislings” who were wanted by the Yugoslav government.
The case excerpt also explained that the Review Board had obtained “from a reliable source” information that the applicant
was part of a quisling militia and had participated in the arrests, detentions, and ill-treatment of three different individuals, including one woman who was sent to Auschwitz as the re186
sult of the arrest. The Review Board concluded that the
applicant was excluded under the provisions for war criminals
as well as for other persons who have assisted the enemy in

179. Id. (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 185–89) (photo copy on file with author, 078).
180. Id.
181. See 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 31–33; 1949 Manual, supra note
170 (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 148) (photo copy on
file with author, 043).
182. 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 31(I); 1949 Manual, supra note 170,
at 43(i) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 148) (photo copy
on file with author, 038).
183. See 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 88 (describing the Special Refugee Screening Commission, also known as the Maclean Commission); see also
HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 208 (noting that the Special Refugee Commission
was headed by Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean).
184. 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 88.
185. Id. at 31(I).
186. Id.
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187

persecuting civil populations. The Manuals’ description of the
persecutor bar and its sole example tie the persecutor bar to
conduct prosecuted as crimes against humanity and to the associated requirement of culpability.
In practice, the persecutor bar was more commonly applied
alongside the bar for voluntarily assisting enemy forces in their
188
The guidance
operations against the United Nations.
187. Id.; IRO CONST. annex I, pt. II, ¶¶ (1), (2)(a), reprinted in U.N., supra
note 126, at 20; see 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 31(I); 1949 Manual, supra
note 170, at 43(i) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 148)
(photo copy on file with author, 038).
188. The example, Avsic, 93.731, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva 2218 BA-251 (Sept. 3, 1948) (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 478) (photo copy on file with author, 024–25), included in the 1949 and 1950 Manuals was the only case preserved in the Archive that applied both the war criminals bar and persecutor bar. See 1950
Manual, supra note 170, at 31(I); 1949 Manual, supra note 170 (on file with
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 148) (photo copy on file with author,
038). Of the seventy-five decisions preserved in the Archive that discuss the
persecutor bar, thirty-three excluded individuals on the basis of both bars and
six reversed the application of the bar in favor of the voluntary assistance bar.
See Zubrickas, 84.811, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board,
Geneva 871 (Aug. 1, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 132–33) (reversing persecutor bar
applied in previous decision for lack of substantiation by Jewish Central
Committee and including petitioner within mandate); Porpaczy, 995.459, Int’l
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 8716 K.1174 (June 28,
1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on
file with author, 041–42) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Skaistlauks, 692800/8800, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of
the Review Board, WA-1073/KK.848 (June 12, 1950) (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on file with author, 039) (excluded
under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Aule, 3395, Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 11676 (June 1, 1950) (on file
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 043) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces);
Bliumfeldas, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva
DS/161 (May 22, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43
485) (photo copy on file with author, 010–11) (excluding petitioner under persecutor bar only); Beregfy, N 23191, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva 22223 NA – 1079 HT/N/426 (May 20, 1950) (on file
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 477) (photo copy on file with author, 009) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces);
Czorba, 774706, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva HT/N/549 (May 20, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 034) (excluded under persecutor bar
only); Zern, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, (May 19,
1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on
file with author, 042) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy
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forces); Lehmann, 23955, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva NA – 1283 HT/N/464 (May 19, 1950) (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 057) (excluded
under persecutor bar only); Artinow, 1919, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision
of the Review Board, Geneva DS/62 (May 12, 1950) (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 026–27) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Limion, N 23958, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva NA –
1152 HT/N/399 (May 10, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 054) (excluded under persecutor bar
and for assisting enemy forces); Pusic, 3313, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision
of the Review Board, Geneva DS/132 (May 10, 1950) (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 020–21) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Eichelis, N
22473, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva NA –
1082 HT/N/346 (May 8, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 025) (excluded under persecutor bar
and for assisting enemy forces); Temifrjen, 1.043.414/3, Int’l Refugee Org.
[IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva L/A 261 (May 08, 1950) (on file
with the National Archive of France, AJ # AJ 43 486) (photo copy on file with
author, 016) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Weber, 1,040.101/4, Int’l
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva L/A 227 (May 8,
1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on
file with author, 018) (excluded under persecutor bar and as ethnic German);
Turgzyn, 81.274, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 5569 (Apr. 19, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43
142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 107) (reversing persecutor bar finding
and including petitioner within the Mandate); Tratsh, 942236, Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva MA – 496 EK/523 (Apr. 5,
1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 484) (photo copy on
file with author, 010) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy
forces); Fuchs, 1.013.173, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva HT/W/115 (Mar. 30, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 121) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Ginters, 252157, Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 15971 (Mar. 24, 1950) (on
file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 477) (photo copy on file with
author, 016–17) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Vamos, MI-481, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board,
Geneva MA-409/EK.370 (Mar. 24, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 484) (photo copy on file with author, 013) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Schmeta, 10327, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva MA-490 KK/367 (Mar. 24, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 047)
(reversing persecutor bar finding; excluding petitioner for voluntarily assisting
enemy forces); Abdourahaman, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 3538 (Feb. 13, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 052) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Nigeli, 1056489/1, Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva KK/153 (Feb. 07, 1950) (on
file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 484) (photo copy on file with
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author, 004) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces);
Kutilin, 97.652, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva KK/115 (Feb. 3, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43
484) (photo copy on file with author, 003) (excluded under persecutor bar and
for assisting enemy forces); Bajraktarevic, 1.000.084, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO],
Decision of the Review Board, Geneva KK/30 (Jan. 27, 1950) (on file with the
National Archive of France, AJ # 43 484) (photo copy on file with author, 005)
(excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Handler,
1,004.075, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva
KK/9 (Jan. 25, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 484)
(photo copy on file with author, 006) (excluded under persecutor bar and for
assisting enemy forces); Major, 529, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva 15960 (Jan. 24, 1950) (on file with the National Archive
of France, AJ # 43 476) (photo copy on file with author, 07–08) (excluded under
persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Reizas, 995.080, Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 10831 (Jan. 16, 1950) (on
file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on file with
author, 053) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Petrovs, 12186, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 15802 NA 1179/B (Dec.
15, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo
copy on file with author, 001) (not a bona fide refugee or displaced person);
Djuric, 2571, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva
17600 K-39 (Dec. 6, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43
482) (photo copy on file with author, 025) (reversing persecutor bar finding;
excluding petitioner for assisting enemy forces); Tidemanis, 3377, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 11.675 K-20 (Dec. 2,
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on
file with author, 034) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy
forces); Barbath, 998.479, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva LP/12 (Nov. 23, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 134) (photo copy on file with author, 019) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Zubrickas, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva 8710 K.1043 (Nov. 16, 1949) (on file with the National Archive
of France, AJ # 43 143) (photo copy on file with author, 076) (excluded under
persecutor bar only); Urm, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board (Nov. 9, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 482)
(photo copy on file with author, 004) (excluded under persecutor bar and for
assisting enemy forces); Kauls, MI-457 M-361, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 14998 MA-365 K.0261 (Nov. 8, 1949) (on file
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with author, 071) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces);
Sora, 101.680, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva
B INN- 68 (Oct. 27, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43
181) (photo copy on file with author, 053) (no valid objection); Miriuka, Int’l
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board (Oct. 24, 1949) (on file with
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on file with author,
023) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Valancic,
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board (Oct. 10, 1949) (on file
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with author, 008) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces);
Janota, 815784, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Gene-
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va WA – 435/K (Oct. 8, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 060) (excluded under persecutor bar
only); Spanic, 6448, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board,
Geneva 15765 WA – 214/K K.0011 (Sept. 30, 1949) (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with author, 009) (reversing
persecutor bar finding; excluding petitioner for assisting enemy forces);
Kalaba, 6422, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva
WA – 22/K K.0003 (Sept. 29, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 019) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Becic, 6398, Int’l Refugee Org.
[IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva WA – 213/K K0009 (Sept. 29,
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on
file with author, 020) (reversing persecutor bar finding; excluding petitioner
for assisting enemy forces); Veladic, 6452, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of
the Review Board, Geneva 15763 WA – 212/K K.0005 (Sept. 29, 1949) (on file
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with author, 011) (reversing persecutor bar finding; excluding petitioner for assisting
enemy forces); [name illegible], 97.631, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of
the Review Board, Geneva 9986 (Sept. 16, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 046) (excluded
under persecutor bar only); Vejo, 6450, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of
the Review Board, Geneva WA – 219/K K.0002 (Sept. 9, 1949) (on file with the
National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 025)
(reversing persecutor bar finding; excluding petitioner for assisting enemy
forces); Kanminskij, 81 269/3, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva 8855 (Aug. 30, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 045) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Rada, 88.042, Int’l Refugee Org.
[IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 5557 (Aug. 3, 1949) (on file with
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 056) (reversing prior decision’s application of persecutor bar and including petitioner within the Mandate); Vehlaid, 6569, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO],
Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 9272/293/F (July 27, 1949) (on file with
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on file with author,
006) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Tiesenhausen, 2962, Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 12387 KC/2962 (July 15,
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on
file with author, 009) (excluded under persecutor bar and as ethnic German);
Kappaurs, 2377, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 12363 (July 8, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43
479) (photo copy on file with author, 002) (excluded under persecutor bar and
for assisting enemy forces); Jurkus, 1419, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of
the Review Board, Geneva 6007 (July 2, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 057) (excluded
under persecutor bar only); Putnieks, 298633, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 9227 BB.2833 (June 22, 1949) (on file with
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author,
042) (included within the Mandate); Stauga, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision
of the Review Board, Geneva 11251 B.B.2835 (June 22, 1949) (on file with the
National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 031–
32) (included within the Mandate); Aleksander, 2051, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO],
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Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 9273 NA-290/P (May 27, 1949) (on file
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on file with author, 005) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Krajnc, 88.809, Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva K.1145 (Apr. 13, 1949) (on
file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with
author, 075) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Mixrut, 98.327, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 9925 TK-171 (Mar. 29, 1949) (on
file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with
author, 016) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces);
Simon, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 2997
(Mar. 12, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181)
(photo copy on file with author, 061–62) (excluded under persecutor bar and
for assisting enemy forces); Jakab, 997.012/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva LA. 651 (Mar. 11, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with author, 057) (included within the Mandate); Banfai, 999.048/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO],
Decision of the Review Board, Geneva LA.626 (Mar. 11, 1949) (on file with the
National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with author, 017)
(reversing persecutor bar finding; including petitioner within the IRO Mandate); Bertok, 996.401/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva LA.628 (Mar. 11, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with author, 021) (included within the
Mandate); Stranak, 771089, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva WA – 464/K.0033 (Mar. 10, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 021) (reversing
persecutor bar; excluding petitioner as not a bona fide refugee or displaced
person); Orlowsky, 11365, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva NA-211/K (Feb. 9, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 024) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Klein, 280, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva Aug A – 251/K (Jan. 31, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 054) (excluded
under persecutor bar and as ethnic German); Slemr, 11546, Int’l Refugee Org.
[IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva AA – 91/K (Jan. 27, 1949) (on file
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 055) (excluded under persecutor bar, for assisting enemy forces, and for
being an ethnic German); Vrankovic, 996.301, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva LA 336 (Jan. 27, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 120)
(excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Mesnikoff,
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 3079 (Jan. 11,
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on
file with author, 066) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Franic, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva B.I. 104 (Dec. 8, 1948)
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 478) (photo copy on file
with author, 065–66) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy
forces); Szylasy, WA-31/K, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva 1796 (Nov. 19, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 161) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Ausiura, 83.736, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva K.647 (Nov. 3, 1948) (on file with the National Archive
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included in the Manuals on the nature of the membership and
activities of various groups drove these decisions. This guidance
evolved based on information that emerged through post-war
189
activities and was expanded with each edition. However, all
versions of the Manual designated members of certain groups
only as prima facie ineligible, allowing individual applicants to
rebut the presumption with evidence of individual innocence of
the acts perpetrated by these groups.
For example, according to the 1947 Eligibility Manual, Estonian, Lithuanian, and Latvian applicants who joined the military after 1943 were considered eligible for benefits because
190
conscription was said to have begun in January 1943. The
Manual made an exception for those who served in the German
SS because of its voluntary nature and for “members of units
notorious for atrocities unless they can prove that they were
191
Members of the Baltic Waffen SS
individually innocent.”
units were initially considered conscripts and potentially eligiof France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with author, 013–14) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Niemann, 4522, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Wurzburg WA-117/p (Nov. 2,
1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on
file with author, 012) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy
forces); Rada, 88.048, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board,
Geneva K.711 (Nov. 2, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 057) (excluded under persecutor
bar); Marincak, 84.444, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva K 559 (Oct. 19, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 010) (excluded under
persecutor bar only); Pauer, 84.477, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva K 558 (Oct. 19, 1948) (on file with the National Archive
of France, AJ # 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 045) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Avsic, 93.731, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of
the Review Board, Geneva 2218 BA-251 (Sept. 3, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 478) (photo copy on file with author, 024–25)
(excluded under bar for war criminals/quislings and persecutor bar); Muller,
81.251/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 273
(July 5, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142–43)
(photo copy on file with author, 029) (reversing persecutor bar; excluding petitioner as ethnic German).
189. From the start, the IRO leadership recognized that the determination
of eligibility “is necessarily, a continuous process because of additional information received” and eventual reduction in need for resettlement services.
1947 Directive, supra note 170 (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 146) (photo copy on file with author, 001).
190. 1947 Manual, supra note 170, at app. V, at 3 (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 185–89) (photo copy on file with author, 086).
191. Id.
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192

ble for services. After the publication of the 1947 Manual, the
IRO Director General called for further investigation based on
questions regarding the treatment of former members of the
193
Baltic Waffen SS units by the former Latvian Minister. A Secret Memo was prepared that reviewed the results of an inquiry
into records of the U.S. Army on the unit, and findings from the
194
International Military Tribunal at the Nuremberg Trials. The
Memo assessed eligibility under the persecutor bar and the bar
195
for assisting enemy operations. It cited the findings of the International Military Tribunal that the units were involved in
“the persecution and extermination of the Jews, brutalities and
killings in concentration camps, excesses in the administration
of occupied territories, the administration of the slave labour
programmes and the mis-treatment and murder of prisoners of
196
war.” The Tribunal determined that members of the SS units
“with knowledge that it was being used for the commission of
acts declared criminal by [the International Military Tribunal
Charter], or who were personally implicated as members of the
organisation in the commission of such crimes” were part of a
197
criminal group. The inquiry also revealed that Estonian and
Latvian members of the Baltic Waffen SS units had been given
a choice of serving in the Waffen SS division or in the forced la198
bor units (Arbeitsadienst). The committee decided to employ
the “burden of proof” employed by the U.S. Military Government Courts in the Denazification trials and accepted by the
U.N. Chief Prosecutor in Nuremberg that created a rebuttable
199
presumption based on membership. As a consequence of this
choice, members of the SS units were changed to prima facie
192. Id.
193. Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Exec. Comm., Memorandum of the DirectorGeneral on Policy Regarding Baltic Refugees, EC/OD/1 (Mar. 21, 1949) [hereinafter IRO Exec. Comm. Memo] (on file with the National Archive of France,
AJ # 43 131) (photo copy on file with author, 064–80).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 131) (photo
copy on file with author, 073–77).
197. Id. (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 131) (photo
copy on file with author, 073).
198. Id. (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 131) (photo
copy on file with author, 067–75); 1949 Manual, supra note 170 (on file with
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 148) (photo copy on file with author,
120–21).
199. IRO Exec. Comm. Memo, supra note 193 (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 131 074) (photo copy on file with author, 43).
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ineligible as voluntarily assisting the enemy in their opera200
tions.
The final 1950 Manual includes additional details as to the
formation of the Baltic Waffen S.S. units from para-military
groups (Schutzmannschaften) that were comprised mostly of
201
volunteers and charged with police and guard duties. The
Manual states that members of the Schutzmannschaften are
prima facie ineligible but “this presumption may be rebutted if
the applicant can produce evidence that he was conscripted and
if it is made plausible that he did not commit atrocities or oth202
Similarly, the 13
erwise persecute civilian populations.”
SS/Handzar Division, active in Yugoslavia during the war, was
described as a “division [that] indulged in excesses equal to
those of any troops in the Balkans,” and its members were prima facie ineligible as a result (archival research reveals two
examples in which prima facie ineligibility was successfully re203
butted by members of this group).
Additional guidance can be found in the IRO’s appellate
review of eligibility determinations themselves. Between its inception in early 1948 and the conclusion of its operations at the
end in 1952, the Review Board issued over thirty-five thousand
204
decisions. One thousand four hundred and twenty-five of the205
se decisions are preserved in the French National Archive.
200. Id. (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 131) (photo
copy on file with author, 078); 1949 Manual, supra note 170 (on file with the
National Archive of France, AJ # 43 148) (photo copy on file with author, 123).
201. 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 54–55.
202. Id. at 57.
203. Id. at 84; Veladic, 6452, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 15763 WA-212/K K.0005 (Sept. 29, 1949) (on file with the
National Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with author, 011);
Vejo, 6450, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva
WA-219/K K.0002 (Sept. 29, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 025).
204. HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 565 (explaining that active operations for
the entire IRO ended on January 31, 1952); see also Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO],
Summary Record of the 95th Meeting of the General Council, GC/SR/95 (Mar.
4, 1952) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 117–24) (photo
copy on file with author, (General Council Records) 312, 314) (discussing the
end of the Review Board on February 15, 1952).
205. The vast majority of these decisions were destroyed so as to avoid disclosure of confidential information and the use of the decisions by countries
wishing to punish political dissidents. Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Summary Record of the 101st Meeting of the General Council, at 15–16, GC/SR/101 (Mar. 7,
1952) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 117–24) (photo
copy on file with author, (General Council Records) 302–04) (discussing trans-
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These decisions demonstrate several principles in the application of the persecutor bar.
First and most importantly, the bar was not applied to victims of the Nazi regime. The 1950 Eligibility Manual describes
the operations of the concentration camps, notes the use of inmates to enforce discipline, and states that these inmates were
206
at times responsible for more brutality than the SS guards.
However, the Manual does not then indicate that victims of the
Nazi regime who were forced to take on enforcement and operational roles within the camps were ineligible, as the Manual in207
dicates for Nazi groups implicated in atrocities. Of the sixtyfive decisions preserved in the Archive that examine cases of
individuals who claimed they were victims of the Nazi or fascist
regimes, none were excluded for assisting the enemy in perse208
cuting others. There is one decision from a political prisoner

fer of all Review Board decisions to the office of the U.N. High Commissioner
on Refugees and the Commissioner’s commitment to destroy all decisions that
were no longer needed).
206. 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 101–02; see also Fedorenko v. United
States, 449 U.S. 490, 534–36 & nn. 4–9 (1981) (J. Stevens, dissenting).
207. Compare 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 102, with id. at 89 (Ustashi;
SS Handzar Division), and id. at 81 (Zveno), and id. at 78 (Iron Guard), and
id. at 74 (members of Berczenyi League who participated in the murder of
Jews in Ruthenia).
208. Heckers, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 020.4220 (Apr. 3, 1951) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 477) (photo copy on file with author, 005–06); Renelt, HA-310, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 20043 HA-246/EK.911
(May 31, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 051–52); Molz, N 20932, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO],
Decision of the Review Board, Geneva NA - 1129 HT/N/499-545 (May 19, 1950)
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file
with author, 075); Hassan, 75.994/2, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva L/A 349 (May 15, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on file with author, 004–06);
Bottenwinser, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva
L/A 175 (May 2, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43
486) (photo copy on file with author, 019–20); [name illegible], Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board (May 1950) (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 046–47);
Heisner, 1,103.615, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board,
Geneva HT/W/213 (Apr. 4, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France,
AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 131); Heyman, 604486, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva BA – 238/P 227 (Apr.
4, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy
on file with author, 141); Jolitz, 603883, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of
the Review Board, Geneva BA – 261/P 237 (Apr. 4, 1950) (on file with the Na-
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tional Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 095);
Rosenkranz, 1,013.116, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board,
Geneva HT/W/111 (Apr. 4, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France,
AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 129); Rosenkranz, 1,014.783, Int’l
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva HT/W/111 (Apr. 4,
1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on
file with author, 128); Hasse, 609329, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva BA – 255/P 236 (Apr. 4, 1950) (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 096);
Heilmark, 610073, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board,
Geneva BA – 256/P 242. (Apr. 4, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 111); Hilprecht, 610619,
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva BA – 256/P
241 (Apr. 4, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141)
(photo copy on file with author, 143); Joseph, 609311, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO],
Decision of the Review Board, Geneva HA – 221/P 207 (Apr. 4, 1950) (on file
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 099); Groeger, 1,010.293, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva 13.864 HT/W/194 (Apr. 3, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 133); Riewe,
610395, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva BA –
242/P 142 (Apr. 3, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43
141) (photo copy on file with author, 074); Rosenberg, 1,013.312, Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva HT/W/123 (Apr. 2, 1950) (on
file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with
author, 124); Ctvrtecka, 1,013.318, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva HT/W/125 (Apr. 1, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 123); Pollak,
1,014.560, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva
HT/W/152 (Apr. 1, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43
485) (photo copy on file with author, 119); Hamburger, 1,013.215, Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva HT/W/113 (Mar. 31, 1950)
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file
with author, 118); Schulze, 609265, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva B – 223/P 201 (Mar. 31, 1950) (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 068);
Steinhauer, 1,013.432, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board,
Geneva HT/W/124 (Mar. 31, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 167); Weigler, 1,014.333,
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva HT/W/187
(Mar. 31, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485)
(photo copy on file with author, 180); Ring, 604734, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO],
Decision of the Review Board, Geneva NA – 204/F 185 (Mar. 29, 1950) (on file
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 080); Fraenkel, 1,013.690, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva HT/W/171 (Mar. 21, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 132); Moskowitz,
1,012.887, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva
HT/W/23 (Mar. 20, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43
485) (photo copy on file with author, 126); Soncinas, 487, Int’l Refugee Org.
[IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 10412 Aug A-498/v87 (Jan. 9,
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1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on
file with author, 119); Reznik, MI-197, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva MA-174/V.131 (Dec. 5, 1949) (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 061); Lusbig,
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board (Nov. 24, 1949) (on file
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with author, 005–06); Schabowski, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board (Nov. 24, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43
181) (photo copy on file with author, 011); Engel, 1,048.270, Int’l Refugee Org.
[IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva LP/13 (Nov. 23, 1949) (on file
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with author, 039); Molnar, 1,047.999, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva LP/3 (Nov. 23, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 024); Oettinger,
604878, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva BA93/K K.0204/B (Nov. 4, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 004); Sternberg, 604937, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva K.0205/B BA-726/K
(Nov. 3, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo
copy on file with author, 135); Heinich, 605808, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva BA-145 K.0211/B (Nov. 1, 1949) (on file with
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author,
112); Junack, 604102, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board,
Geneva BA – 79K K.0192/B (Oct. 26, 1949) (on file with the National Archive
of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 102); Kueri, 1,010.079,
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva B.V. 170 (Oct.
19, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo
copy on file with author, 049); Adler-Alfoeldi, 88 365/3, Int’l Refugee Org.
[IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva K 128 (Aug. 30, 1949) (on file
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with author, 004); Hoffmann, MI-233, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva MA – 213/P (Aug. 30, 1949) (on file with the National Archive
of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 160); Hansmeyer,
604353, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva BA –
73/P (Aug. 11, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141)
(photo copy on file with author, 082); Heitmann, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva BA – 169/P (Aug. 11, 1949) (on file with
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author,
115); Henke, 604472, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board,
Geneva BA – 74/P (Aug. 11, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France,
AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 120); Henning, 604877, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva BA – 76/P (Aug. 11,
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on
file with author, 122); Moreas, 2555, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board (Aug. 8, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 076); Fain, 1.009.353, Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 12207 PV/9B (July 21, 1949)
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file
with author, 077); Zel-nak, 1820 1/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva 8023 (July 7, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 059); Luks-Weinreb, Int’l

502

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:453

in a concentration camp that mentions he was a clerk, and not
a kapo, but this is the only decision among the Jewish and nonJewish victims that discusses an inmate’s role in the camp, and
209
the function of the note is not clear. In contrast, non-victims
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 3277 (May 31,
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on
file with author, 034); Strauber, 1.037.784, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision
of the Review Board, Geneva 3199 (May 23, 1949) (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 035);
Rumschisky, 1.032.216, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva 3100 (May 10, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 036); Stieber, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 7443 LI.583 (Apr. 30,
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on
file with author, 065); Zeilinger, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 7360 LI.601 (Apr. 30, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 074); Gaon, Int’l
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 2734 (Apr. 30,
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on
file with author, 013); Schultz, 13570, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva NA-391/P (Apr. 4, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 065–66);
Boetticher de Klein, 495, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva T 1644 495 (Feb. 4, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 003); Mentzen-Theuna,
147.143, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 4807
T – 1299 (Jan. 21, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43
180) (photo copy on file with author, 029–30); Heilbrunn, 1334, Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 62.3 (Dec. 9, 1948) (on file
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 035–36); Hohenstein, 1589, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 6210 1589/P (Dec. 9, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 033–34);
Koransky, 1335, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 6208 1335/P (Dec. 9, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 031–32); Lengert, 100.799, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva T 1448 (Nov. 31, 1948)
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # AJ 43 180) (photo copy on
file with author, 027–28); Djukic, 88.266, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of
the Review Board, Geneva K.729 (Nov. 4, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 143) (photo copy on file with author, 045–46);
Schwarz, 10176, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva NA – 106/k (Oct. 21, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 072); Morstadt, 167.499, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva T.1208 (Sept. 8, 1948)
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file
with author, 040); Joskovicz, 5871, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva NA-222 (Aug. 18, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 100).
209. Schultz, 13570, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
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who were part of units under Nazi control were systematically
screened for disqualification under the persecutor bar even
once they were able to show they were otherwise eligible for
210
IRO services.
Second, the persecutor bar was in fact seldom invoked. Of
the 1425 decisions preserved in the archive, only seventy-five
discuss the persecutor bar at all, and only twenty decisions exclude applicants on this basis alone, while ten reverse the ap211
plication of the bar. The remaining forty-five decisions apply
the persecutor bar in conjunction with another exclusion. A review of these seventy-five decisions illustrates additional requirements for the bar.
The decisions show that voluntarily joining a group active
in the commission of atrocities against civilian populations was
sufficient for exclusion from benefits absent exonerating evi212
dence. For example, Yugoslavs who chose to join the Ustas
213
were excluded based on the harms inflicted by those forces. A
Board, Geneva NA-391/P (Apr. 4, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 065–66).
210. Stauga, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 11251 B.B.2835 (June 22, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 031–32) (Latvian Legion);
Putnieks, 298633, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 9227 BB.2833 (June 22, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 042) (Latvian Legion);
Banfai, 999.048/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva LA. 626 (Mar. 11, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 142) (photo copy on file with author, 017) (Hungarian Police); Jakab,
997.012/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva LA.
651 (Mar. 11, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142)
(photo copy on file with author, 057) (Hungarian Gendarmerie); Bertok,
996.401/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva LA.
628 (Mar. 11, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142)
(photo copy on file with author, 021) (Hungarian Gendarmerie).
211. See supra note 188 (citing all cases involving the persecutor bar and
describing the basis for each IRO decision). [Editors’ note: Minnesota Law Review could not independently verify the numbers in this paragraph.]
212. Some decisions applied the voluntariness requirement to both the bar
for assisting enemy operations and for assisting the enemy in persecution by
noting the voluntary nature of the individual’s participation in a persecutory
group. See, e.g., Pusic, 3313, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva DS/132 (May 10, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 020–21).
213. Bajraktarevic, 1.000.084, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva KK/30 (Jan. 27, 1950) (on file with the National Archive
of France, AJ # 43 484) (photo copy on file with author, 005); Franic, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva B.I. 104 (Dec. 8, 1948)
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Latvian volunteer in the German Gestapo and the Latvian SS
Division was barred based on a denunciation for his involvement in the executions and deportations that took place in the
214
Warsaw Ghetto. Accountability for the voluntary choice to
join a unit known for its brutality also applied even if the petitioner was conscripted into service, but had an option to join a
general army unit, instead of one implicated in the persecution
215
of Jews and other civilian groups.
The same was true for individuals who voluntarily joined
anti-Semitic groups known for their support of brutal tactics in
occupied territories because they shared these beliefs. For ex216
ample, a member of the Arrow Cross Party was excluded in a
decision that described the applicant as convinced of the
“rightness of its cause” and that the party was the “salvation of

(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 478) (photo copy on file
with author, 065–66); Mixrut, 98.327, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, 9925 TK-171 (Mar. 29, 1949) (on file with the National Archive
of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 016); see 1950 Manual,
supra note 170, at 83 (explaining that “all Ustas units had a bad record of excesses and atrocities” and that the Krizari were one of several Ustas groups);
see also Fuchs, 1.013.173, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva HT/W/115 (Mar. 30, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 121) (voluntarily joined
SS division in Poland); Abdourahaman, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of
the Review Board, Geneva 3538 (Feb. 13, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 052) (volunteered
in Tartar police which was involved in punitive actions against civilians).
214. Skaitslauks, 692800/8800, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva WA-1073/EK.848 (June 12, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on file with author, 039).
215. See, e.g., Tratsch, 942236, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva MA – 496, EK523 (Apr. 5, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 484) (photo copy on file with author, 010)
(stating the petitioner “was taken in a police raid,” but still excluding him because he “voluntarily joined the German Wehrmacht”); Urm, Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board (Nov. 9, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with author, 004)
(stating that the choice of the petitioner to join the “notorious” Schutzpolizei
instead of the German Wehrmacht units renders him ineligible under the persecutor bar and the bar for voluntary assistance); Kalaba, 6422, Int’l Refugee
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva WA – 22/K K.0003 (Sept. 29,
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on
file with author, 019) (stating service in the SS in Bosnia justified exclusion
under the persecutor bar).
216. A violently anti-Semitic and totalitarian group. 1950 Manual, supra
note 170, at 72.
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217

Hungary.” A Lithuanian member of the Nazi party as of 1939
was similarly barred for his long-standing belief in Nazi poli218
cies.
The exclusion was also used to capture individuals who
had engaged in direct acts of economic persecution against
primarily Jewish populations and were thus not subject to the
exclusion for assisting enemy forces in their operations against
the United Nations. Holding a high office in a governmental
unit that implemented a persecutory policy or taking affirmative action to benefit from that policy resulted in exclusion. A
liaison officer between the Hungarian Ministry of Finance and
the Office of the High Commissioner for the Abandoned Jewish
Property was excluded for failure to rebut the presumption that
he participated in persecution through expropriation of proper219
ty as an officer of the High Commission. But taking personal
advantage of expropriation, regardless of position, could also
220
lead to exclusion. A member of the Hlinka Guard was excluded for his assumption of ownership over a farm whose Jewish
owners were dispossessed as part of a policy of “aryanizat221
ion.”

217. Vamos, MI-481, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva MA-409/EK.370 (Mar. 24, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 484) (photo copy on file with author, 013).
218. Klawieter, 97.631, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva 9986 (Sept. 16, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 046); see also Zern, Int’l
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva (May 19, 1950) (on
file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on file with
author, 042) (noting the petitioner created a German circle for Nazi party
members in Poland).
219. Czorba, 774706, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva HT/N/549 (May 20, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 034).
220. A group considered by the Eligibility Board to be fascist and a counterpart to the German SS. 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 62.
221. Marincak, 84.444, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva K 559 (Oct. 19, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 010); see also
Tiesenhausen, 2962, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board,
Geneva 12387 KC/2962 (July 15, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on file with author, 009) (excluding Nazi party member that administered expropriation of property from Polish farmers);
Krajnc, 88.809, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva K.1145 (Apr. 13, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43
142) (photo copy on file with author, 075) (excluding petitioner for receiving
property from displaced Poles and employment as a German interpreter; the
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Direct and personal action was required where the nature
of the group did not create a presumption of persecutory conduct. The Review Board reversed the application of the persecutor bar to a member of the Czechoslovak Gendarmerie in the
222
absence of evidence “as to his personal activities.” Another
was reversed for lack of evidence that the applicant “took part
in the persecution of civil population[s]” notwithstanding the
notorious reputation of the SS division to which he was at223
tached. A voluntary member of the Hungarian Gendarmerie,
which was responsible for the escort of Jewish transports, was
excluded for voluntary assistance to the enemy in their operations against the United Nations, but not for assisting the en224
emy in persecution. The Review Board reversed an ineligibility determination under the persecutor bar for a Lithuanian
applicant who served in a German unit, after he was able to
prove on a second appeal that he used his service to further
225
Lithuanian resistance movements. A Latvian chief of police,
on the other hand, was barred because the Review Board had
evidence of his personal responsibility for the execution of Jews
226
and gypsies in his district.
High level officers in forces under German command were
deemed personally responsible for the violent policies they executed even if not all units participated in those policies. Lowerlevel officers within those same forces, however, were not excluded without evidence of personal involvement in persecution. For example, a petitioner who held a high position within
the Hungarian Gendarmerie while under German High Command and was responsible for carrying out German policy was
Board also notes that his son, born in 1940, was named Adolf).
222. Stranak, 771089, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva WA – 464/K.0033 (Mar. 10, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 021).
223. Vejo, 6450, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board,
Geneva WA – 219/K K.0002 (Sept. 29, 1949) (on file with the National Archive
of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 025); accord Veladic,
6452, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 15763
WA – 212/K K.0005 (Sept. 29, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with author, 011).
224. 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 33(I) ex. 4.
225. Ausiura, 83.736, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva K.647 (Nov. 3, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with author, 013–14).
226. Eichelis, N 22473, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva NA – 1082 HT/N/346 (May 8, 1950) (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 025).
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excluded while a low-ranking member of the Hungarian Gen228
darmerie was not. However, this principle was not without
qualification where the underlying presumptions were shown
to be inapplicable in a given case. For example, a Hungarian
soldier who had been promoted within his unit was not excluded due to his rank because he explained that the promotions
were due to his pre-war service and not tied to his performance
229
as a commander of enemy forces.
230
231
Investigators and interpreters were excluded regardless of conscription due to their positions of trust and their sig-

227. Szylasy, WA-31/K, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva 1796 (Nov. 19, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 161); see Bliumfeldas,
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva DS/161 (May
22, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo
copy on file with author, 010–11) (excluding the petitioner under persecutor
bar). Similar to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Fedorenko, the Review Board
noted the commendation the applicant received from German authorities for
his service in the Lithuanian criminal police and the German Security Police
as evidence of his “voluntary” assistance in persecuting civilian populations.
Id.; see also Beregfy, N 23191, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva 22223 NA – 1079 HT/N/426 (May 20, 1950) (on file with the
National Archive of France, AJ # 43 477) (photo copy on file with author, 009)
(excluding the wife of the Minister of War of the Szalasi regime, who had been
executed after the war, for benefiting from her husband’s activity); Major, 529,
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 15960 (Jan.
24, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 476) (photo
copy on file with author, 007–08) (excluding applicant who held one of the
highest military positions in the Szalasi regime, who was responsible for collecting 500,000 nationals for service in the German Wehrmacht even though
he said his aim was to keep those conscripts from serving on the front lines by
constantly delaying their deployment). Ferenc Szalasi led the Arrow Cross—a
pro-Nazi party—and became head of state in 1944. RAPHAEL PATAI, THE JEWS
OF HUNGARY: HISTORY, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY 584 (1996). Under his rule,
the Arrow Cross, together with the German Reich, were responsible for the
murder of ten to fifteen thousand Jews. Id. at 590. He was hanged in Hungary
for crimes against the state. Id. at 589.
228. Rada, 88.042, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board,
Geneva 5557 (Aug. 3, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 056).
229. Id. (reversing application of the persecutor bar).
230. Barbath, 998.479, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva LP/12 (Nov. 23, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 143) (photo copy on file with author, 019) (finding a husband
ineligible because he was responsible for arrests of many Communists in Hungary, and his wife’s ineligibility followed from her husband’s); Mesnikoff, Int’l
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 3079 (Jan. 11,
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on
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nificant level of involvement in causing the atrocities perpetuated by their superiors. As the Review Board explained in one
case, the petitioner abandoned his pre-war occupation and used
his knowledge of Russian “for preferment in a unit notorious for
232
its excesses.” Informants were barred because their action led
directly to persecution by the Germans. A member of a proNazi group in Czechoslovakia was excluded based on the
group’s philosophy and the fact he was “personally implicated”
233
in denouncing resisters to the Germans. Another petitioner
unassociated with a particular group was barred for denouncing his neighbor to the Germans (and the neighbor was subse234
quently arrested).
Participation as a concentration camp guard was generally
235
sufficient to trigger the persecutor bar absent other evidence,
file with author, 066).
231. Artinow, 1919, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board,
Geneva DS/62 (May 12, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ
# 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 026–27) (discussing the “position of
trust” he had as an interpreter for the Germans and that his role meant he
“associated himself with them . . . and against the civilian populations”); Handler, 1,004.075, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva KK/9 (Jan. 25, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43
484) (photo copy on file with author, 006) (noting that petitioner who claimed
only that he was employed as an interpreter was also a corporal in the security police in Austria); Orlowsky, 11365, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva NA-211/K (Feb. 9, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 024).
232. Kappaurs, 2377, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva 12363 (July 8, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on file with author, 002).
233. Janota, 815784, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva WA – 435/K (Oct. 8, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 060).
234. Weber, 1,040.101/4, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, Geneva L/A 227 (May 8, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on file with author, 018); see also Pauer,
84.477, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva K 558
(Oct. 19, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142–43)
(photo copy on file with author, 045) (“[I]t is established that the role of the
Gestapo in Czechoslovakia was in persecuting the civil population and consequently any ‘informant’ or ‘witness’ for them is excluded under [the persecutor
bar].”).
235. E.g., [name illegible], 2051, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Geneva 9273 NA-290/P (July 27, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on file with author, 005)
(stating that service in the perimeter guard of a work camp under the direction of the Waffen SS assisted in the persecution of civilians); Jurkus, 1419,
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 6007 (July 2,
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but even camp commanders could rebut a presumption of exclusion with evidence that established their own lack of personal participation in atrocities. The Review Board determined
in one case that the petitioner’s plea that he was conscripted
into the Waffen SS was not credible and also stated that the
236
persecutor bar would still apply to involuntary service. But
the next month, the Review Board considered the appeal of an
applicant who joined the gendarmerie and became the commander of a collection camp housing 4000 Jews, in light of his
promise to provide a statement from Jews in that camp that he
237
did not personally participate in their persecution. This was
determined despite the fact that the camp inmates had been
taken by other officers and killed when confronted by Allied
forces because the applicant alleged the executions were performed without his knowledge or involvement. The applicant
eventually failed to produce the promised statement exonerating him from personal involvement and the Review Board concluded that “[i]n view of petitioner’s failure to submit the proof
he promised, and since it is essential for a favourable determination of the appeal” he was barred for assisting the enemy in
persecution and in their operations against the United Na238
tions. Notably, this evidence provides a somewhat different
account of IRO eligibility than provided by Foreign Service Of239
ficer Jenkins in his testimony in Fedorenko. Officer Jenkins
testified that SS members who joined involuntarily were not
excluded from the IRO and compared this group to the concentration camp guards who were categorically excluded, stating
that the difference was due to the acts for which those groups
240
were responsible. In reality, however, the same presumptions
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on
file with author, 057); Niemann, 4522, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the
Review Board, Wurzburg WA-117/p (Nov. 2, 1948) (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on file with author, 012) (excluding petitioner because he was “entrusted with guard and police functions in
German occupied territory”); see, e.g., Black, supra note 37, at 40–43 (describing required actions taken by camp guards).
236. Timofajew, 1.043.414/3, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva L/A 261 (May 8, 1950) (on file with the National Archive
of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on file with author, 016).
237. Porpaczy, 995.459, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review
Board, 8716 K.1174 (June 28, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 041–42).
238. Id.
239. See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
240. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 510 n.32 (1981).
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applied to both groups. SS members and camp guards were
prima facie ineligible because members of both generally could
have chosen to join units who were engaged in normal warfare,
not persecutory campaigns, but would have experienced worse
conditions by joining those units. SS members and concentration camp guards alike were held accountable for the activities
of those units absent evidence of individual innocence in the
acts performed.
The common thread through the policy directives and individual decisions is the Review Board’s search for indicia of personal culpability. Culpability could take the form of a choice to
join a more brutal unit, merit promotion to a position of responsibility to implement Nazi policy, seeking personal gain from
the economic persecution of Jews and other Nazi targets, or
taking direct action to facilitate the immediate persecution
perpetuated by the Nazis or their counterparts. Moreover, an
affiliation with a persecutory unit gave rise only to a presumption of ineligibility—one that could be rebutted with evidence of
personal innocence even in the context of the atrocities of World
War II. Most importantly, victims were not barred. Rather, the
victims of persecution were considered apart from their persecutors and were not screened for actions they were forced to
take while simply trying to survive.
These materials demonstrate that the persecutor bar, as
conceived at the time it was first incorporated into U.S. law,
did not, as the Fedorenko Court asserted, exclude all those who
assisted in the persecution of civilians. Nor did it exclude from
benefits, as the Negusie Court described, those who engaged in
241
“nonculpable, involuntary assistance.” And, it was not applied, as the BIA concluded, based only on the “objective ef242
fects” of an individual’s actions. The bar was not categorical:
evidence of individual innocence in the actions of the group was
a defense and victims were not considered persecutors. Consequently, the bar applied only to individuals who took specific
and direct action to cause the persecution of others or to benefit
from it. In other words, the bar assigned blame.

241. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 520 (2009).
242. In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 465 (B.I.A. 1983), rev’d,
Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).
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III. TRACING THE ORIGIN OF THE PERSECUTOR BAR IN
U.S. LAW
Having recovered the confines of the persecutor bar as it
was originally applied, this Article discusses next the “weight
and relevance” of this history as displayed in the statements of
congressional intent that accompanied the bar’s enactment
throughout U.S. immigration law.
The Court in Negusie directed the BIA to focus on the
meaning of the persecutor bar in the Refugee Act. The legislative history of the Refugee Act, however, shows that when Congress created that bar, it drew on other persecution-related
bars contained in prior immigration laws. This Part follows the
persecutor bar’s common statutory language and legislative
history from its origin in the Constitution of the IRO through
its appearance in the Refugee Act to its most recent replication
in a form of relief from deportation. Indeed, in addition to disqualifying an immigrant from protection under the Refugee
Act, Congress has barred individuals who have “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in . . . persecution” from
cancellation of removal, lawful permanent resident status, and
naturalization, creating separate grounds of inadmissibility
243
and deportability based on that conduct. Part III also identifies the additional sources Congress invoked as informing its
understanding of the persecutor bar. In light of this history, I
assert that the bar should be interpreted consistently across
immigration law and should give substantial “weight and relevance” to the bar’s meaning at the time it was first adopted in
U.S. law.
A. THE DISPLACED PERSONS ACT OF 1948 AND THE REFUGEE
RELIEF ACT OF 1953 INCORPORATE THE PERSECUTOR BAR FROM
THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION
The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 contains the first appearance of a persecutor bar in U.S. law. It did so by referencing and incorporating the definitions and exclusions of the IRO
Constitution. Congress enacted the DPA in June 1948 to allow
for the admission of 220,000 refugees and displaced persons living in European IRO camps without regard to the quota system
244
that was in place in U.S. immigration law at the time.
243. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(E) (2012).
244. H.R. REP. NO. 80-2410 (1948) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1948
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2053, 2053. The DPA of 1948 was heavily criticized for its anti-
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In drafting the DPA, Congress incorporated the IRO’s definitions and eligibility criteria by reference and then added its
245
own limitations. The Act also created the Displaced Persons
246
Commission, tasked with administering the Act and investigating visa applicants to assess their “character, history, and
247
eligibility.” The DPA defined a “[d]isplaced person” as anyone
who met the definition of “refugee” or “displaced person” and
Semitic intent and effects. See LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, AMERICA AND THE
SURVIVORS OF THE HOLOCAUST 137–82 (1982) (including several chapters concerning congressional actions surrounding the DPA); ROBERT A. DIVINE,
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1924-1952, at 120 (1957); HAIM GENIZI,
AMERICA’S FAIR SHARE: THE ADMISSION AND RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED
PERSONS, 1945-1952, at 66–111 (1993) (discussing, in a manner similar to
Dinnerstein, congressional actions surrounding the DPA); LOESCHER &
SCANLAN, supra note 128, at 21. The Act limited eligibility to those displaced
persons who were in Germany, Austria, or Italy before December 22, 1945,
which excluded “more than 100,000 Jews who were released from Russia in
the spring of 1946 and/or who fled the Polish pogroms that summer.”
DINNERSTEIN, supra, at 166. It also prioritized agricultural workers, a profession with few Jewish members, and designated forty percent of the visas for
displaced persons from Baltic countries, many of whom had been active in Nazi forces. LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 128, at 20. The Act further allowed for the emigration of ethnic Germans who had been living outside Germany and Austria at the time of the war and were returned to those countries
after the war’s conclusion. This population was excluded from the IRO and
was accused of containing Nazi collaborators, but was eligible for emigration
under the DPA. GENIZI, supra, at 81, 90. The legislative history reflected the
express purpose of the Act’s proponents to limit Jewish emigration.
DINNERSTEIN, supra, at 137–38, 145, 164, 175. President Truman called the
Act “flagrantly discriminatory” but signed it anyway. Id. at 175; DIVINE, supra, at 128.
245. The Act was only passed after years of debate though and contained
limitations on the timing and location of European displacements designed to
prevent the immigration of Jewish victims of persecution. See Anker & Posner,
The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 9, 12–13 (1981); see also Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Summary
Record of 24th Meeting of the Executive Committee, at 3–4, EC/SR/24 (Mar. 28,
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 131) (photo copy on
file with author, 041–42) (providing a statement by the European Director of
the Displaced Persons Commission acknowledging the inequities contained in
the 1948 law and the hope that those inequities would be amended through
proposals being debated at the time). The Act also set out priorities for visas,
preferring (1) agricultural workers; (2) household, construction, clothing, and
garment workers or displaced persons “possessing special educational, scientific, technological or professional qualifications”; or (3) blood relatives of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents. Displaced Persons Act of
1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 6, 62 Stat. 1009, 1012 (1948).
246. Displaced Persons Act § 8.
247. Id. § 10.
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was “the concern of the International Refugee Organization” as
248
set out in the IRO Constitution. Because the IRO Constitution excludes anyone who “assisted the enemy in persecuting
civil populations” of U.N. member countries, Congress incorporated the persecutor bar directly into U.S. law by adopting the
249
IRO’s eligibility provisions. The DPA was amended in 1950 to
increase the number of visas that could be granted, to extend
the Act’s duration until 1952, to include some persons of German ethnic origin who had been excluded by the IRO Constitution, and to formally include consular officers and INS officials
250
in the visa approval process. The exclusions contained in 2(a)
and 2(b) of the IRO Constitution were retained through the
continued reference to the IRO definitions in Annex I of the
Constitution, but the 1950 amendment also included the perse251
cutor bar explicitly in the statute’s text. The DPA as amended
specifically provided that no visa could be granted “to any person who advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person
because of race, religion, or national origin, or to any person
who has voluntarily borne arms against the United States dur252
ing World War II.”
The legislative history of the 1948 DPA is silent with respect to the persecutor bar. Contemporary records show that
the application of the persecutor bar under the DPA was actually largely determined by IRO officials. The congressional debate centered on the restrictions to limit those IRO beneficiar253
ies who could obtain visas to the United States. In 1950, a
congressional member remarked that the amended Act would

248. Id. § 2(b).
249. IRO CONST. annex I, pt. II, ¶ (2)(a), reprinted in U.N., supra note 126,
at 20.
250. See Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (1950). These changes largely alleviated the anti-Semitic restrictions contained in the earlier version by eliminating the 1945 cut-off date, the preference for agricultural workers, and the
quota for Baltic applicants. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 244, at 247–48;
LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 128, at 22. In the end, over 360,000 individuals were admitted to the United States under the DPA including 100,000
Jews. Id. at 251; accord GENIZI, supra note 244, at 111; see also DIVINE, supra
note 244, at 144 n.40 (stating that the grand total was 378,623).
251. § 11, 64 Stat. at 227.
252. Id.
253. Massey, supra note 16, at 114–15; see 95 CONG. REC. 7169–202 (1949);
94 CONG. REC. 7727–34 (1948); 94 CONG. REC. 7770–78 (1948); see also S. REP.
NO. 81-1237 (1950), as reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2513, 2514 (discussing
imprecision of the IRO displaced person definition).
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254

now bar past persecutors, seemingly unaware that the DPA
already contained this bar through its adoption of the IRO eli255
gibility criteria. The primacy of the IRO adjudications in the
functioning of the DPA is confirmed by both IRO documents
and statements by U.S. officials. A flow chart issued by the
IRO shows that only applicants deemed eligible for IRO services were forwarded to U.S. officials for additional inspec256
tion. A member of the foreign service testifying before Congress on the visa review process by the Displaced Persons
Commission explained that the delay in file transfer and the
pure volume of applications meant that reviewing officers relied almost exclusively on the IRO file containing its eligibility
257
determination. Additionally, the European Coordinator of the
Displaced Persons Commission addressed the Executive Committee of the IRO and thanked the organization for rapidly processing displaced persons, without which implementation of the
258
DPA would not have been possible. The scope of the bar in
the DPA was thus effectively set by its administrators in the
IRO.
The DPA expired in 1952 and the Refugee Relief Act (RRA)
259
of 1953 took its place. Congress passed the RRA to authorize
the grant of visas to refugees outside of the country-based quo254. 95 CONG. REC. 7184.
255. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 2(b), 62 Stat.
1009, 1009 (1948).
256. Exec. Sec’y of the Preparatory Comm’n, supra note 54, at 33–35.
257. Alleged Nazi War Criminals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, & Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.
106–07 (1978) (explaining that the Displaced Persons Commission relied on
the file and eligibility determination made by the IRO).
258. Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Summary Record of 24th Meeting of the Executive Committee, at 3–4, EC/SR/24 (Mar. 28, 1949) (on file with the National
Archive of France, AJ # 43 131) (photo copy on file with author, 041–42); Int’l
Refugee Org. [IRO], Summary Record of 80th Meeting of the Executive Committee, at 4, EC/SR/80 (Oct. 26, 1951) (on file with the National Archive of
France, AJ 43 132) (photo copy on file with author, 021) (recording the statement of the Commissioner of the INS as he expressed his appreciation for the
magnitude of the IRO’s displaced persons program and describing the program
as the “most important phase of their work”); see also DINNERSTEIN, supra
note 244, at 184 (describing how the Displaced Persons Commission hired individuals who had worked for UNRRA and the IRO and shared the outlook of
these organizations).
259. Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400 (1953). The IRO was
created as a time-limited organization. It ceased operations in 1952 and was
dissolved in 1953; the DPA sunset in 1952 accordingly. Pub. L. No. 81-555, § 8,
64 Stat. 219, 225 (1950); HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 24.
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ta system established by the 1952 Immigration and Nationality
260
Act (INA). The RRA also carried forward the 1950 amendment to the DPA and prohibited the issuance of a visa for “any
person who personally advocated or assisted in the persecution
of any person or group of persons because of race, religion, or
261
national origin.”
B. THE HOLTZMAN AMENDMENT OF 1978 INSERTS THE
PERSECUTOR BAR INTO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
With the Holtzman Amendment, Congress amended the
INA to create grounds of exclusion and deportation for assisting
262
in the persecution of others. Using the same language that
appeared later in the Refugee Act, the amendments provided
that a noncitizen was excludable or deportable if he “ordered,
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of
any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political
263
opinion.” The amendment was limited, however, to persecu264
tion associated with the Nazis during World War II. The
amendment also barred a grant of withholding of deportation—
the predecessor to one of the forms of protection included in the
265
Refugee Act—on the same basis.
The legislative history described the amendment as closing
“an undesirable loophole in current U.S. immigration law” that
had allowed past persecutors to enter the United States
through the INA, whereas, those individuals who had immi260. Refugee Relief Act §§ 3–4.
261. Id. § 14(a).
262. Holtzman Amendment, Pub. L. 95-549, §§ 101, 103, 92 Stat. 2065,
2065–66 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 3 (1978), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700, 4702.
263. Holtzman Amendment §§ 212(a)(33), 241(a)(19) (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(33), 1251(a)(19) (1982)).
264. Section 212(a)(33) applied to aliens associated with the Nazis “during
the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending on May 8, 1945.” Id. It
made “[a]ny alien” deportable if the alien was under the direction of or in association with “the Nazi government” or “any government in any area occupied
by the military forces of the Nazi government . . . or any government which
was an ally of the Nazi government” that “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion,
national origin, or political opinion.” Id.
265. Id. Withholding of deportation was the precursor to withholding of
removal. Similar to its current form, withholding of deportation prevented a
noncitizen from being deported to any country in which an individual would be
subject to persecution on account of race, religion, national origin, or political
opinion. Id. § 243(h) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1978)).
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grated under the DPA or the RRA were subject to the persecu266
tor bar. The amendment was prompted by renewed efforts to
identify and deport former Nazis so that they could be tried for
267
war crimes in their home countries.
The congressional report accompanying the amendment
specifically acknowledged the inclusion of the persecutor bar in
the DPA, the RRA and the IRO Constitution and explained that
the amendment would “establish within the permanent U.S.
immigration law a provision which has appeared previously in
268
[these] special refugee measures.” The report also described
the INA’s provision for withholding of deportation, in its
amended form to include a persecutor bar, as meeting the
United States’ obligations under the 1967 United Nations Protocol on the Status of Refugees and “coextensive” with the 1951
United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees which
269
were incorporated by the 1967 Protocol.
The report also makes explicit that the term “persecution”
in the bar was understood to require deliberate and intentional
action in accordance with the principles of liability for war
crimes. Congress explicitly declined to include a definition for
“persecution,” and in its report, the House Judiciary Committee
acknowledged accordingly that the bar would require “difficult
270
and very delicate determinations.” The Committee explained
that administration of the bar should be guided by the “accepted precept of international law that ‘persecution’ is a ‘crime
271
against humanity,’” and that immigration officials should
make case-by-case determinations “in accordance with the case
law” that has developed around the admission of refugees and
withholding of deportation “as well as international material on

266. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 4.
267. See Birnbaum, supra note 42, at 211; Black, supra note 37, at 1–9; K.
Lesli Ligorner, Nazi Concentration Camp Guard Service Equals “Good Moral
Character”?: United States v. Lindert, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 145, 156
(1997); Lippman, supra note 86, at 51–52; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 4
(discussing the work of the special investigation unit in the INS and the need
for the legislative amendments to allow for deportation of two suspected Nazi
war criminals who had been admitted under the INA, as opposed to the DPA
or RRA, and thus were not deportable under current law).
268. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 4.
269. Id. at 5. For a discussion on the obligations created by the 1967 United Nations Protocol on the Status of Refugees, see infra Part III.
270. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 6–8.
271. Id. at 8.
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the subject such as the opinions of the Nuremberg tribunals.”
Here, the committee specifically noted the definition of persecution developed in the Nuremberg tribunals and the DPA con273
cerning the type and degree of harm involved. It further stated that “it is important to stress that the conduct envisioned
must be of a deliberate and severe nature” and that where persecution is asserted as the result of a government statute or
rule, it must be clear that “the objective of such statute or rule
was to deliberately inflict severe harm or suffering on a particular person or group of persons based on race, religion, national
274
origin, or political opinion.”
With the Holtzman Amendment, Congress moved the persecutor bar from isolated and circumscribed immigration initiatives to its major regulatory scheme so that the bar governed
admission, deportation, and eligibility for protection as a refugee. In doing so, Congress tied the bar’s scope to its role in the
DPA, the jurisprudence of the war crimes tribunals, and to the
common understanding of “persecution.” These sources respectively required culpability, allowed for a duress defense, and
designated deliberate action with a specific intent to cause
harm. The amendment, and its corresponding legislative history, consequently provides important insight into the congressional understanding of the bar’s key sources. Congress invoked these same sources two years later when it included the
persecutor bar in the Refugee Act of 1980.
C. THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 RETAINS THE PERSECUTOR BAR
The version of the persecutor bar at issue in Negusie was
275
created by the Refugee Act of 1980. The Act created two basic
forms of protection from persecution in one’s home country. The
first is asylum, which is granted as a matter of agency discretion, and requires an applicant to meet the definition of a refu276
gee. U.S. asylum law now also requires an applicant to apply
within one-year of entry into the United States subject to cer277
tain exceptions for changed and extraordinary circumstances.
272. Id. at 7.
273. Id. at 5–7 (referring to deliberate infliction of severe harm such that
the action constitutes a “crime against humanity”).
274. Id. at 7.
275. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 203(e), § 243(h)(1)–(2), 94
Stat. 102, 107 (1980).
276. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012).
277. Id. § 1158(a)(2)(B).
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A refugee is defined to include a person who has left her country of nationality or residence and is unwilling to return to that
country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
278
particular social group, or political opinion . . . .” If a noncitizen is ineligible for asylum based on the one-year deadline or
279
certain criminal convictions, she can apply for the second
280
form of protection: withholding of removal. Withholding of
removal provides fewer benefits and requires a higher likeli281
hood of future harm, but—like asylum—this form of protection in the Refugee Act prevented the noncitizen’s return to a
country if the “alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in
such country on account of race, religion, nationality, member282
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
The refugee definition in the Refugee Act incorporates the
definition contained in the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relat283
ing to the Status of Refugees. The Protocol requires States
278. Refugee Act § 101(a)(42). The full text provides the following definition:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .
Id.
279. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B).
280. Id. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (disqualifying applicant from asylum for conviction of an aggravated felony regardless of the sentence).
281. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that an individual with only a
ten percent chance of being persecuted still may possess fear based on a “reasonable possibility.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987). Following this articulation, the ten percent standard has been used by federal courts
and agency adjudicators as the probability of harm required in asylum claims.
See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES, § 2.2, at 56
n.17 (2015 ed.) (citing federal court decisions applying the ten percent standard). Withholding of removal also does not provide a path to lawful permanent
residence and citizenship or the ability to reunify with family members living
in the noncitizen’s home country.
282. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 243(h), § 203(e), 94 Stat.
102, 107. The current version—found in United States Code 2012—of withholding of removal states that the harm must be “because of” race, religion,
etc., but is otherwise unchanged. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
283. U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I(2), Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter U.N. Protocol]. The U.N.
Protocol incorporated the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees. Id.; U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
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Parties to protect “refugees” through its mandate that “[n]o
Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler ’) a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or po284
litical opinion.”
Though Congress mirrored the 1967 Protocol’s definition of
a “refugee,” it did not mirror the Protocol’s exclusions. The Protocol disqualifies from protection anyone for whom there are
“serious reasons” to believe that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity, as def ined in the international instruments drawn
up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country
of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles
285
of the United Nations.

The Protocol created a fourth exclusion by eliminating the
prohibition on refoulement for “a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
gees, art. I, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter U.N.
Convention]. The refugee definition in the 1951 Convention was limited to
“events occurring before 1 January 1951.” Id. at 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189
U.N.T.S. at 152. The definition also includes stateless individuals. Id. Article
1B of the 1951 Convention allowed State Parties to interpret “events occurring
before 1 January 1951” as limited to events in Europe or as events in Europe
and elsewhere. Id. at 19 U.S.T. at 6262, 89 U.N.T.S. at 154. The Protocol’s
“refugee” definition eliminated the geographical and temporal restrictions and
covers anyone “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country,” or
who is stateless and cannot return to her country of habitual residence due to
a fear of persecution. See U.N. Protocol, supra, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S.
at 268–70 (quoting the incorporated refugee definition from the U.N. Convention). Although the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol in 1968, it did
not incorporate the obligations these agreements imposed until 1980. See
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 427–29 (discussing the history of the Refugee
Act). The incorporation of the 1967 Protocol obligations came after legislative
and executive compromise. See generally Anker & Posner, supra note 245, at
16 (analyzing the Refugee Act’s compromises between legislative and executive control over refugee admission and the legislative trade-offs that produced
the Act’s final text).
284. U.N. Protocol, supra note 283, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268
(quoting the incorporated restrictions found in the U.N. Convention).
285. Id. art. 1F, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268 (quoting the incorporated disqualifications contained in the U.N. Convention).
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country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger
286
to the community of that country.”
Congress, on the other hand, created a different set of exclusions for asylum or withholding of removal, some of which
have corollaries in the 1967 Protocol and others of which do
not. Through the Refugee Act, Congress barred from protection
a noncitizen if:
(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in
the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion;
(B) the alien, having been convicted by a f inal judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the
United States;
(C) there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the
arrival of the alien in the United States;
(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger
287
to the security of the United States.

Congress also doubly excluded “any person who ordered,
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of
any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” from the
288
definition of a “refugee.” Where the Refugee Act’s second,
third, and fourth exclusions have corollaries in the 1967 Protocol, the language of the persecutor bar does not appear in the
Convention and Protocol. Conversely, the Protocol’s exclusion
for individuals who have committed “a crime against the peace,
a war crime, or a crime against humanity” and for individuals
“guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations” do not appear explicitly in the Refugee Act.
This apparent disconnect in scope of the exclusions is largely
eliminated, however, by the legislative history describing the
Refugee Act as consistent with the protections afforded by the
1967 Protocol.
At the time of its enactment, congressional statements
made clear that the Refugee Act was intended to conform U.S.
law to the major international refugee agreement to which it
286. Id. art. 33, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268 (quoting the incorporated “non-refoulement” exclusion from the U.N. Convention).
287. Refugee Act of 1980 § 203(e). These bars remain substantively the
same today. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A) (2012); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B), (h)(2)(A)–
(D).
288. Refugee Act of 1980 § 201(a).
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had acceded: the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the
289
Status of Refugees. That legislative history also explains that
the U.N. Convention and Protocol should guide the scope of the
Act’s exclusions. Notwithstanding the inclusion of the persecutor bar in the definition of “refugee,” the House Judiciary
Committee’s report on the Refugee Act declared that the Act
will “finally bring United States law into conformity with the
internationally-accepted [sic] definition of the term ‘refugee’ set
290
forth in the [Convention and Protocol] . . . .” Specifically, the
Committee explained that the bar is “consistent with the U.N.
Convention (which does not apply to those who, inter alia,
‘committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity’), and with the two special statutory enactments under which refugees were admitted to this country after World War II, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and the
291
Refugee Relief Act of 1953.” The Judiciary Committee further
noted that the bar in the Refugee Act reflects the exception
“provided in the Convention relating to aliens who have them292
selves participated in persecution . . . .” The Conference
Committee adopted the House’s definition of refugee with the
persecutor bar amendment, and described the final text as
“incorporat[ing] the U.N. definition,” repeating “the understanding that [the refugee definition] is based directly upon the
language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be
293
construed consistent with the Protocol.”

289. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
290. H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 9 (1979); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at
19–20 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 160, 160–61
(adopting the “internationally-accepted [sic] definition of refugee contained in
the U.N. Convention and Protocol” and noting that the withholding of removal
provision is to be “construed consistent with the Protocol”); S. REP. NO. 96-256,
at 4, 9 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144, 149 (stating that
the Act’s refugee definition “will bring United States law into conformity with
our international treaty obligations” and provide protection “to those who
qualify under the terms of the United Nations Protocol”).
291. H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 10.
292. Id. at 18. The U.N. Convention and Protocol, however, lack the same
explicit language. See supra notes 285, 287 and accompanying text.
293. H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at 19–20; see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 9
(stating Congress’s intention to “bring United States law into conformity with
the internationally-accepted definition of the term ‘refugee’ set forth” in the
Convention and Protocol); see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427
(1999) (“As we explained in Cardoza-Fonseca, ‘one of [Congress’s] primary
purposes’ in passing the Refugee Act was to implement the principles agreed
to in the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to
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Thus, the legislative history reflects an understanding that
the Act’s coverage was coextensive with the obligations created
by the U.N. Convention and Protocol. Moreover, the statements
reveal the congressional belief that these agreements were consistent with the DPA and RRA in their exclusion of individuals
who had participated in the persecution of others. The bar contained in the Refugee Act is best interpreted by taking into account its parallel paths through both international and U.S.
law and arriving at a definition that is consistent with both.
The development of the persecutor bar in U.S. law did not
end with the 1980 Refugee Act, however. In 1981, Congress
added a persecutor bar to suspension of deportation, a form of
discretionary immigration relief based on length of residency in
294
the United States and hardship caused by deportation. The
accompanying congressional report explained that the 1981
changes incorporated the “strict policies” of the Holtzman
Amendment to disqualify noncitizens “who have participated in
295
the Nazis’ persecution of others.” Through the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of
1996, Congress replaced suspension of deportation with cancellation of removal, which requires a longer period of residence, a
stricter hardship standard, and contains more disqualifying
296
criminal offenses. With these changes, Congress replaced the
Nazi-specific persecutor bar created by the Holtzman Amend-

which the United States acceded in 1968.” (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987) (citation omitted)).
294. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-116, sec. 18(h)(2), § 244(a), 95 Stat. 1611, 1620 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982)).
295. H.R. REP. NO. 97-264, at 34 (1981), as reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2577, 2603. The Board interpreted the amendment to be retroactive to the
1978 legislation as a result. In re Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 71 (B.I.A.
1984). The amendment also barred Nazi persecutors from voluntary departure, a form of relief that allows a noncitizen to leave the United States without receiving a formal deportation order that would affect the noncitizen’s future immigration options and criminal penalties for illegal reentry.
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments § 18(h)(2).
296. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 304(a), § 240A(a)–(b), 110 Stat. 3009–544 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)–(b) (1997)); see also Nancy Morawetz,
Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited
Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1949 (2000) (describing
the dramatic changes rendered by the 1996 reforms which greatly expanded
the criminal ground for deportation and inadmissibility and greatly restricted
the ability of noncitizens to seek relief from these charges).

2016]

DRAWING LINES

523

ment with the general bar created by the Refugee Act, again
connecting the iterations of the persecutor bar across U.S. im297
migration law.
In sum, the persecutor bar originated in the IRO Constitution. Congress incorporated it into the DPA, replicated it in the
RRA, added it to several provisions of the INA through the
Holtzman Amendment, included it in the Refugee Act, incorporated it into another form of relief in the INA, and finally included it in changes made by the IIRIRA. The congressional
statements associated with these acts describe the multiple appearances of the persecutor bar in U.S. law as consistent, and
reference its common source in the IRO Constitution. The
statements also refer to the international refugee agreements
and the jurisprudence of the international war crimes tribunals
as informing the meaning of the persecutor bar.
The Fedorenko Court focused only on the persecutor bar
contained in the DPA. The Negusie Court focused only on the
bar in the Refugee Act. But the legislative history demonstrates
that these Acts are intertwined. To arrive at a coherent interpretation that is consistent with congressional intent, the immigration agency should therefore consider the bar’s long history and the international sources Congress repeatedly invoked.
The next Part describes how these sources apply the nascent
requirement for culpability displayed by IRO administrators
and create a coherent doctrine in the form of the duress defense.
IV. CONVERGENCE IN THE DURESS DEFENSE
After Negusie, the agency must arrive at an interpretation
of the persecutor bar that harmonizes the various statements of
congressional intent and ascribes the same meaning to the
same language that appears both inside and outside the Refu298
gee Act. I contend that the sources on which Congress relied
when including the persecutor bar within the Refugee Act converge in a requirement for personal culpability in order for an
act to disqualify someone from humanitarian protection and
that culpability in this context is best measured through the
297. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
§ 304(a).
298. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014)
(“[I]dentical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have
the same meaning.” (citing Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561,
574 (2007))).
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299

defense of duress. This Part first examines how the exclusions from protection contained in the U.N. Convention and
Protocol on the Status of Refugees were rooted in principles developed by the military tribunals created to try war crimes. I
then discuss the standards used by these tribunals to assign
culpability and their recognition of duress as a defense. Next, I
describe how these standards are reflected in the practices of
other States Parties in their implementation of the U.N. Convention and Protocol. Finally, this Part concludes with a discussion of the immigration agency’s use of duress as a defense
to similar exclusions in another provision of immigration law
and asserts that incorporating duress into the interpretation of
the persecutor bar is necessary to effecting congressional intent.
When including the persecutor bar in the Refugee Act,
Congress pointed to the RRA, the DPA, and the U.N. Convention and Protocol and concluded that the bar was consistent
300
with all three. The congressional Committee report accompanying the Holtzman Amendment, which added a version of the
persecutor bar to the prior form of refugee protection, features
the most comprehensive discussion of the bar, and cites these
301
three sources, as well as the Nuremberg Military Tribunals.
Consequently, I look first at the requirements for blameworthiness present in both the U.N. Convention and Protocol that
generated the Refugee Act and in the military tribunals that
informed the meaning of the bar in the INA.
Because Congress intended the Refugee Act to conform
U.S. law to the U.N. Convention and Protocol, the scope of the
exclusions in the international agreements is critical to the
302
persecutor bar’s proper interpretation in U.S. law.

299. See supra notes 20–32 and accompanying text (discussing the concept
of culpability and its related components).
300. See supra notes 289–93 and accompanying text (discussing congressional statements regarding the Refugee Act).
301. See supra notes 268–74 (discussing congressional statements regarding the Holtzman Amendment).
302. See supra notes 289–93 and accompanying text (describing the legislative history of the Refugee Act). Attorney General Ashcroft stated that because
the 1967 Protocol is not self-executing, it cannot serve as an independent
source of rights and protections for refugees. In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572,
584 n.8 (Att’y Gen. 2003). Instead, the protections are defined by and limited
to Congress’s provisions in the Refugee Act. Id. Nonetheless, Congress’s intent
to incorporate the protection obligations created by the 1967 Protocol is wellestablished. The conference report issued with the final text of the Refugee Act
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The exclusions contained in the Convention and Protocol
were based on the documents that framed the military tribunals following World War II, specifically the Charter of the International Military Tribunals. An early draft of the 1951 U.N.
303
Convention explicitly cited the Charter in its first exclusion.
The Charter for the International Military Tribunal defined
304
the crimes to be tried by the International Military Tribunal.
These offenses included “crimes against peace,” “war crimes,”
305
The Charter described
and “crimes against humanity.”
“crimes against humanity” as “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war; or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of
306
the country where perpetuated.” Control Council Law No. 10,
in turn, authorized the Allied governments to create additional
tribunals through which to try individuals charged with the
states that the “four specific conditions,” which serve as exceptions to the
guarantee of nonrefoulement, match “those set forth in the aforementioned international agreements.” H.R. REP. NO. 96-78,1 at 20, (1980) (Conf. Rep.), as
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 161; see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526
U.S. 415, 427 (1999); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421, 425 (1987); INS v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425–26 (1984) (discussing the legislative intent of the
Refugee Act). Additionally, the Supreme Court has made clear that statutes
should not be interpreted so as to violate U.S. treaty obligations absent a clear
statement from Congress. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.,
466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
303. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 16, at 163–65; U.N. High
Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, ¶¶ 148, 150, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992)
[hereinafter “UNHCR Handbook”]. This initial draft also referenced Article 14
of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides:
1. Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum
from persecution.
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely
arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 14, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
304. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, and the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1556 [hereinafter Charter].
305. Id.
306. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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307

crimes defined by the Charter. The U.S. created the Nurem308
berg Military Tribunals for this purpose. The final version of
the U.N. Convention’s first exclusion was revised to reference
the Charter more generally while explicitly referring to the
309
same list of offenses that were defined in the Charter. As the
text indicates, the Convention’s drafters sought to tie the exclusions from protection to the offenses for which World War II’s
310
major war criminals had been tried. Some sources indicate
that the persecutor bar in U.S. law is encompassed by the first
exclusion in the Convention and Protocol; others tie it to the
311
third exclusion. Either way, the exclusions contained in the
Convention and Protocol that Congress incorporated through
the Refugee Act were built on the international military tribunals. Consequently, the U.N. guidance on the meaning of these
312
exclusions looks to these tribunals as a guide.
The tribunals demonstrate that determining culpability
requires a two-step analysis: (1) are the actions committed sufficient to constitute one of the defined offenses that gives rise
to an exclusion; and (2) if so, is there an available defense such
as duress? With respect to the first step, more than mere membership in a group that has engaged in the persecution of oth-

307. 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
BUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at XVI–XVII, XXI (1949).

TRI-

308. Id. at XXI (citing Ordinance No. 7).
309. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 16, at 163–65. The final text of
Article 1(F)(a) provides that the Convention shall not apply to any person who
has “committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in
respect of such crimes.” U.N. Convention, supra note 283, at 156.
310. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 16, at 173–76; JAMES C.
HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 567 (2d ed.
2014); ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 66–67.
311. The first exclusion lists “crimes against humanity.” The third exclusion replicates the language from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which was explicitly referenced in the initial draft of the exclusion for
war criminals. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 16, at 184. The prevailing view is that the exclusion is limited to heads of State and high officials, but
includes individuals not necessarily connected with a government who have
engaged in extreme violations of human rights. Id. at 184–90 (noting that the
British representative for the United Nations supposed that this article covered war crimes, genocide and the subversion or overthrow of democratic regimes). The UNHCR Handbook discusses these two exclusions as overlapping
and explains that the third exclusion is directed at individuals in positions of
power. UNHCR Handbook ¶¶ 162–63.
312. See infra notes 355–62 and accompanying text.
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ers is required for the exclusion to be triggered. The International Military Tribunal declared:
Since the declaration with respect to the organizations and groups
will, as has been pointed out, f ix the criminality of its members, that
def inition should exclude persons who had no knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the organization and those who were drafted
by the State for membership, unless they were personally implicated
in the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter
as members of the organization. Membership alone is not enough to
313
come within the scope of these declarations.

The military tribunals convened by various Allied forces,
including the United States, followed suit and evaluated an accused’s rank, responsibilities, and knowledge of the actions of
the group to which he was a part before convicting him of
crimes against humanity or the other offenses laid out in the
314
Charter.
The tribunals’ requirements for knowledge and direct involvement in the commission of an offense mirrors the approach taken by the IRO administrators. Membership in a persecutory group created a presumption that the persecutor bar
applied but could be rebutted with evidence that an individual
did not personally participate in the harms caused by the
group. It also aligns with Massey’s framework to analyze individual responsibility for collective actions, which proposed liability under the persecutor bar only where the individual personally participated in the harm or where he had knowledge of
315
the acts of the group and directly contributed to those acts.
Massey too asserted that membership alone in a group whose
objective was to persecute others was insufficient to trigger the
316
bar. The requirements for knowledge and a direct contribution to the harm, however, conflict with the BIA’s objective effects test, which demands neither knowledge of the organization’s acts nor personal participation in the harm caused before
317
applying the persecutor bar.

313. 15 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIM151 (1949) (citing British Command Paper, cmd. 6964, 67 (second emphasis added)).
314. Id. at 151–54 (discussing the Flick and I.G. Farben trials conducted by
the U.S. Military Tribunal in Nuremberg as well as the Polish and Dutch applications of the same principles).
315. Massey, supra note 16, at 145–47.
316. Id. at 147.
317. In re Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 69 (B.I.A. 1984) (stating that the
“objective effect” test did not require personal participation in persecution).
INALS
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The military tribunals defined not only the crimes incorporated into the Convention and Protocol, but also established
their defenses. One such defense was duress. The International
Military Tribunal explained the concept in its judgment in the
Trial of the Major War Criminals in Nuremberg, Germany. It
discussed the governing law of its Charter and the principle of
individual culpability for war crimes committed pursuant to a
318
The Tribunal explained that “[c]rimes
policy of a State.
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities” and that the individuals who commit them must
319
be punished in order to enforce international law. Evidence
that a crime was committed under orders from a superior could
320
thus not negate culpability but only mitigate punishment. Instead, to establish a cognizable defense, the Tribunal stated
that “[t]he true test . . . is not the existence of the order, but
321
whether moral choice was in fact possible.” So long as there
was moral choice there was culpability.
The question became how to determine whether moral
choice was truly absent. The United Nations War Crimes
Commission articulated a general standard for duress based on
its examination of over 1900 decisions by military tribunals as
well as British, American, and European laws on duress. The
report concluded that duress is an available defense if: “(a) the
act charged was done to avoid an immediate danger both serious and irreparable; (b) there was no adequate means of es322
cape; (c) the remedy was not disproportionate to the evil.”
The United States Nuremberg Military Tribunals likewise
employed a test for duress formulated in different ways in different cases but with the same ultimate purpose of evaluating
freedom of choice. One trial looked at whether the accused was
threatened with a “clear and present danger” at the time he
323
used forced labor; another followed the International Military
Tribunal’s articulation and examined whether the circumstances surrounding an order from a superior are “such . . . as to af-

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 176, at 222–23.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
Id.
U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, supra note 313, at 174.
The Flick Case, in 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at
1196–1201 (1952) [hereinafter The Flick Case]; U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N,
supra note 313, at 171.

2016]

DRAWING LINES

529

ford the one receiving it of no other moral choice than to comply
324
therewith”; a third required “a showing of circumstances such
that a reasonable man would apprehend that he was in such
imminent physical peril as to deprive him of freedom to choose
325
the right and refrain from the wrong.” The U.S. tribunal acting in the Einsatzgruppen trial expressed:
[T]here is no law which requires that an innocent man must forfeit
his life or suffer serious harm in order to avoid committing a crime
which he condemns. The threat, however, must be imminent, real,
and inevitable. No court will punish a man who, with a loaded pistol
326
at his head, is compelled to pull a lethal lever.

The meaning of these requirements for duress is illustrated
in the different decisions of the United States Nuremberg Military Tribunals. The Flick trial addresses how the requirement
for a threat of imminent serious harm was applied. The prosecution contended that the defendants had failed to show a
“clear and present” danger that resulted in their use of slave
327
labor to meet the Nazis’ industrial production quotas. The defendants argued that objecting to the Reich’s allocation of labor
would be treated as treason or sabotage and potentially pun328
ished with death. The U.S. tribunal found the threat to be
sufficiently imminent, looking to the full scope of the governing
329
regime. It concluded that the German government imposed a

324. The I.G. Farben Case, in 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at
1176 (1952) [hereinafter The I.G. Farben Case]; U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N,
supra note 313, at 171.
325. U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, supra note 313, at 171–72 (discussing the
High Command trial).
326. The Einsatzgruppen Case, in 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10,
at 480 (1950) [hereinafter The Einsatzgruppen Case]; U.N. WAR CRIMES
COMM’N, supra note 313, at 174. The United States was not alone in articulating a similar standard for duress. In a trial before a British Military Tribunal,
the Judge Advocate addressed the accused’s assertion of duress as a defense
and said, “If you are contemplating that possibly this threat of death may provide a defense then let me ask you not to give effect to it unless you think that
he really was in danger of imminent death and that the evil threatened him
was on balance greater than the evil which he was called upon to perpetuate.”
Id. at 172 (discussing the trial of Gustav Alfred Jepsen). Tribunals convened
by other countries expressed some disagreement over whether duress could
provide a full defense to taking an innocent life, but recognized the defense in
the context of lesser harms. Id. at 173.
327. The Flick Case, supra note 323, at 1201.
328. Id. at 1197–99.
329. Id. at 1201.
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“constant ‘reign of terror’” and that agents of the Reich were
“ready to go into instant action and to mete out savage and
immediate punishment against anyone doing anything that
could be construed as obstructing or hindering the carrying out
330
of government regulations or decrees.” The tribunal, however,
did not acquit several of the co-defendants because they took
initiative to request slave labor and therefore could not show
that the harm they inflicted was limited to what was required
331
under threat.
The Farben trial involved similar charges concerning
crimes against humanity for the use of slave labor in response
to the Reich’s requirement that it produce chemicals used in
332
the mass killings at the concentration camps. The U.S. tribunal looked to the standard described in the Flick trial and determined that the company’s leadership could not make out the
defense of duress because they had gone above and beyond
what was required by the Reich’s labor allocation program. The
leadership had taken the initiative to replace POW workers
with concentration camp inmates to avoid labor unrest, and
333
thus were not acting under threat. However, the plant managers were not found guilty because they had not exercised initiative in obtaining forced labor, and they demonstrated that
334
they had “withheld, at no little risk, their cooperation.” In effect, they were no more than members in a persecutory group,
making no moral choice to inflict harm.
In the Einsatzgruppen case, the U.S. tribunal contended
with the requirement for moral opposition that justifies the de335
fense of duress. In other words, if someone does not object to
harming another and harms that person, then he should be
culpable for his action because he agreed with his coercer that
336
harming another is correct. Duress excuses liability only be330. Id.
331. Id. at 1202.
332. The I.G. Farben Case, supra note 324, at 1176.
333. Id. at 1192. The same was true in the Krupp case based on evidence
that the leadership of the arms manufacturer had requested slave labor alongside evidence that other armament firms had refused to request concentration
camp labor (e.g., there was a reasonable means of escape). The Krupp Case, in
9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1412 (1951) [hereinafter The Krupp
Case].
334. The I.G. Farben Case, supra note 324, at 1192–94.
335. See The Einsatzgruppen Case, supra note 326.
336. The Krupp Case, supra note 333, at 1439 (“In such cases, if, in the ex-
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cause it recognizes that one should not be culpable for harming
others when there was no reasonable possibility to exercise
337
one’s moral choice not to perpetuate that harm. Consequently, moral objection is a predicate to pleading duress. The tribunal in the Einsatzgruppen case enforced the need for moral objection through the requirement to demonstrate that there was
338
no reasonable means to escape harming others. The defendants were leaders of the task forces that implemented Hitler’s
Final Solution and were thus charged with a staggering scale of
339
atrocities. The tribunal rejected the defendants’ claims that
340
refusing to follow orders would have been futile. Instead, it
required evidence that the defendants had tried to avoid inflict341
ing the harm ordered. The tribunal pointed to others who had
fled Germany or had demonstrated efforts to disassociate
342
themselves from the task forces. It explained that the “defendants must have found themselves repeatedly at the crossroads where and when there was still the opportunity to turn in
the direction of the ideals which they had once known, but the
willful determination to follow the trail of blood prints of their
voluntarily accepted leader could only take them to the goal
343
they had never intended.” The absence of evidence that the
defendants had ever tried to do anything but implement the orders was condemning. The only defendant to escape liability in
this tribunal demonstrated his limited time in the Nazi task
force, his forced conscription into it, and his efforts to escape
344
it.
In the High Command trial, the tribunal made more stringent the requirement for resistance of an order (which serves as

ecution of the illegal act, the will of the accused be not thereby overpowered
but instead coincides with the will of those from whom the alleged compulsion
emanates, there is no necessity justifying the illegal conduct.”).
337. See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1367 (1989)
(describing duress as a normative excuse which asks “in light of the nature of
the demand and the expected repercussions from noncompliance, [could we]
fairly expect a person of nonsaintly moral strength to resist the threat” (emphasis and footnote omitted)).
338. The Einsatzgruppen Case, supra note 326.
339. Id. at 369–70.
340. Id. at 482.
341. Id. at 482, 506.
342. Id. at 506–07, 584–87.
343. Id. at 508.
344. Id. at 584–87.
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the evidence of duress’s second prong: one’s inability to escape
engaging in the offending conduct). The tribunal demanded
that the higher the rank of the officer, the more he needed to
demonstrate his attempts to repudiate a directive to commit a
crime against humanity in order to avoid liability for that directive. Consequently, a high ranking officer had to show that
he had taken every possible step to thwart an illegal directive
short of action that would result in his serious injury or
345
death. The only defendant to successfully claim duress in this
tribunal demonstrated the immediate and severe consequences
of refusing the order or of resigning and showed that he did not
346
actually disseminate the order to his subordinates.
The Krupp trial contributed to this developing jurisprudence by discussing the proportionality requirement and the
relevance of subjective evidence. The Krupp defendants consisted of the leadership of the major armaments company in
347
Germany. The company’s head was close to Hitler and the
company worked closely with the SS; the company itself had
348
special dispensation from Hitler to remain privately owned.
These defendants attempted to invoke the defense of duress in
response to charges of crimes against humanity for using slave
labor as the Flick and Farben industrialist defendants had
done with varying degrees of success. The U.S. tribunal rejected the defense largely based on substantial evidence that the
defendants had initiated the use of slave labor and that it was
349
not forced upon them. It also noted that the defendants were
particularly well protected, given their political connections,
and thus the threats that may have been employed against
350
other industrialists were not present here. Consequently, the
tribunal concluded that the defense amounted to a claim that
“[t]o avoid losing my job or the control of my property, I am
warranted in employing thousands of civilian deportees, prisoners of war, and concentration camp inmates; keeping them in
a state of involuntary servitude; exposing them daily to death
345. The High Command Case, in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10,
at 598 (1951). Again, the culpability of a commander was not established by
the persecutory acts of another without evidence of “personal dereliction” that
resulted in a voluntary, criminal act. Id. at 543, 598.
346. Id. at 557–78.
347. The Krupp Case, supra note 333, at 1332.
348. Id. at 1445–46.
349. Id. at 1412–16, 1439.
350. Id. at 1445.
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or great bodily harm under conditions which did in fact result
351
in the deaths of many of them.” It concluded that the remedy
was disproportionate to the evil and that the threat of loss of
352
property will not support a claim of duress. Thus, the relationship between the individual claiming duress and the coercer must be assessed, as not all subjects of a coercive force are
equally positioned to comply or resist. This principle is also reflected in the tribunal’s recognition that subjective evidence is
relevant to assess if “the contemplated compulsion . . . actually
operate[s] upon the will of the accused to the extent that he is
thereby compelled to do what otherwise he would not have
353
done.” This question must be “determined from the standpoint of the honest belief of the particular accused in ques354
tion.”
The U.N. General Assembly affirmed the principles set out
in the Charter and Judgment of the International Military Tri355
bunal. The year after the U.N.’s Law Reports were issued, the
U.N. International Law Commission reviewed these standards
for culpability and recognized that a duress defense was well
356
established. These sources then informed the exclusions in
the Convention and Protocol, tying the standard for culpability
357
for war crimes to the limitations on humanitarian protection.
Following the principles articulated by the international
tribunals, the documents developed by the United Nations
High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) interpreting the exclusions contained in the 1967 Protocol build on this jurisprudence to assess both in the level of action taken and the availability of a defense before excluding an applicant. The UNHCR’s
Exclusion Guidelines set out the principle that all exclusions be
interpreted restrictively, “with great caution,” and “only after a
351. Id. at 1444–45.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1439.
354. Id. at 1438.
355. See G.A. Res. 95(I), at 188 (Dec. 11, 1946).
356. See J. Spiropoulos (Special Rapporteur), Draft Code of Offences
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/25 at 275
(1950); see also Brief for Scholars of International Refugee Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 28–31, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009)
(No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2550611, at *7–11 (describing the connection between
the international military tribunals and the exclusions contained in the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol).
357. HATHAWAY, supra note 310, at 567; ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 66–
67.
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full assessment of the individual circumstances of the case.”
These Guidelines first require “individual responsibility [to] be
established in relation to a crime” listed, which requires, at a
minimum, a “substantial contribution to the commission of a
criminal act, in the knowledge that his or her act or omission
359
would facilitate the criminal conduct.” Membership, per se, is
not enough to support exclusion under the Convention and Pro360
tocol. If the requisite level of action is present such that an
exclusion may be triggered, the UNHCR interprets the U.N.
Convention and Protocol to allow the defense of duress. The defense arises “where the act in question results from the person
concerned necessarily and reasonably avoiding a threat of imminent death, or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm
to him- or herself or another person, and the person does not
intend to cause greater harm than the one sought to be avoid361
ed.” An accompanying Background Note quotes a statement
from the International Military Tribunal as the source of this
requirement: “The criterion for criminal responsibility . . . lies
in moral freedom, in the perpetrator’s ability to choose with re362
spect to the act of which he is accused.”

358. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/05, ¶ 2 (Sept.
4, 2003) [hereinafter Exclusion Guidelines], http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
publications/legal/3f7d48514/guidelines-international-protection-5-application
-exclusion-clauses-article.html; see also Background Note on the Application of
the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 502, 503 (2003) [hereinafter Background
Note] (“[T]he exclusion clauses must always be interpreted restrictively and
should be used with great caution.”).
359. Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 358, ¶¶ 18, 21. Background Note,
supra note 358, at 502–03 (explaining the relationship between the Exclusion
Guidelines, Background Note, and UNHCR Handbook). See generally INS v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999) (describing the Handbook as a “useful interpretive aid”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987)
(acknowledging the UNHCR Handbook as providing “significant guidance” to
the terms of the obligations created by the 1967 U.N. Protocol).
360. Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 358, ¶ 19.
361. Id. ¶ 22; see also Background Note, supra note 358, at 527 (stating the
duress defense applies only when the applicant’s intended harm is not greater
than the harm avoided).
362. Background Note, supra note 358, at 521; see also id. at 527 (quoting
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, U.N. GAOR,
5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at Principle IV, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), and explaining that the defense of superior orders does not absolve the accused “provided
a moral choice was in fact possible for him”).
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Given the history behind the exclusions in the Convention
and Protocol and the U.N.’s corresponding interpretation to require culpability, other States Parties to the 1967 Protocol recognize duress as a defense to the Protocol’s exclusion clauses as
363
a result. Various Canadian courts have recognized duress as
permitting the commission of one of the exclusionary crimes
provided that the harm avoided by the applicant for protection
364
is greater than the harm actually inflicted on the victim.
Courts in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom
have similarly weighed the degree of pressure exerted on the
applicant and the availability of moral choice to determine
365
whether the individual is disqualified from protection.
363. Fatma Marouf argues that U.S. courts should look to the interpretations by other States Parties to the 1967 Protocol when analyzing the meaning
of the Refugee Act. She contends that the principle of treaty interpretation
that gives the opinions of sister signatories considerable weight should likewise apply to U.S. statutes that are incorporative of international treaties
such as the meaning of “refugee” in the Refugee Act. Fatma Marouf, The Role
of Foreign Authorities in U.S. Asylum Adjudication, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 391, 399–420 (2013). The proper level of authority courts should give to
the interpretations of the Protocol’s exclusions is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, the decisions of other States Parties demonstrate an interpretation of the Protocol’s exclusions consistent with the one asserted here and derived from the same sources invoked by Congress when it enacted the Refugee
Act.
364. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Asghedom, [2001] F.C. 972
(Can. Fed. Ct.) (affirming the Immigration Board’s finding that Respondent,
who was a citizen of Eritrea living in Ethiopia, acted under duress when he
was forcibly recruited into the Ethiopian military at age eighteen where he
stood guard during raids of civilian homes, pushed people onto trucks for
transfer to military camp where they were tortured and killed, and buried
dead bodies); Ramirez v. Minister of Emp. & Immigration, [1992] 2 F.C. 306
(Can. Fed. Ct.) (finding that the punishment the Appellant, a citizen of El Salvador, would have endured for deserting the military was much less than the
acts he committed as a member of the military where he was responsible for
capturing, torturing and killing victims).
365. See, e.g., W97/164 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
1998 ATTA 618, ¶ 79 (Austl.) (finding that the applicant, a citizen of Burma,
who participated in the shooting of fleeing activists as a member of the Burmese Navy, was not excluded from refugee protection under Article 1(F)); Refugee Appeal No 2142 (1997) NZRSAA 92 (granting the applicant, a citizen of
Sri Lanka, refugee status even though he was forced to become a member of
the LTTE, and had to help recruit members, provide dynamite used against
the government, and store LTTE belongings at his house); KK v. Secretary of
State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKIAT 00101, (U.K. Immigration Appeal
Tribunal) (finding that duress is grounds for rejecting individual responsibility
under U.N. Convention Article 1F(c) “where the act in question results from
the person concerned . . . avoiding a threat of imminent death, or of continuing
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In addition, the various agencies charged with administering the immigration law have created a duress defense for a
similar bar to admissibility. The INA includes a terrorismrelated inadmissibility ground (TRIG) that covers a wide range
of activity, including a minimal amount of support to certain
366
militant organizations and military training by these groups.
In recognition of the fact some of the activity that falls within
the scope of the TRIG-bar may be coerced—such as the training
of a child soldier by a rebel group or succumbing to the demand
for food by guerilla actors, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and the Attorney General have collaborated to issue standards for formal exemptions to the
367
TRIG-bar for actions taken under duress. The standard employed for the duress exemption in this context includes the
same basic elements as the military tribunals required. The action must be taken “in response to a reasonably-perceived
368
threat of serious harm.” And the adjudicator is instructed to
consider:
whether the applicant reasonably could have avoided, or took steps to
avoid, providing material support; the severity and type of harm inf licted or threatened; to whom the harm or threat of harm was directed (e.g., the applicant, the applicant’s family, the applicant’s
community, etc.); the perceived imminence of the harm threatened;
the perceived likelihood that the threatened harm would be inf licted
(e.g., based on instances of past harm to the applicant, to the applicant’s family, to the applicant’s community, and the manner in which
harm was threatened, etc.)
369

among other circumstantial factors. While parsed differently
than the duress requirements set out by United Nations War
or imminent serious bodily harm to him or herself or another person, and the
person does not intend to cause greater harm than the one sought to be avoided”).
366. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012).
367. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 212(d)(3)(B)(i) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT (2011) (receiving military-type training under duress); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 212(d)(3)(B)(i) OF THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATIONALITY ACT (2011) (solicitation under duress); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY UNDER SEC. 212(d)(3)(B)(i) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT (2007) (material support for terrorist activities
under duress).
368. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PROCESSING THE DISCRETIONARY EXEMPTION TO THE INADMISSIBILITY GROUND FOR PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO CERTAIN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (2007).
369. Id. The other duress exemptions replicate and reference the standard
described in this memorandum.
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Crimes Commission, the need to show a serious pending threat
and the inability to choose a different action are the same. The
agency’s test in this context also considers the coerced person’s
subjective perspective.
The culpability principles established by the international
military tribunals permeate the bar’s history in U.S. law. The
IRO eligibility directives, the congressional report accompanying the Holtzman Amendment, and the report accompanying
the Refugee Act, each discuss the persecutor bar in conjunction
with “crimes against humanity” as that offense was applied by
international military tribunals. Additionally, when Congress
amended the INA to add a persecutor bar to admission and
withholding of deportation, it specifically cited the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal in discussing the
meaning of “persecution” and the bar’s conformance with the
370
U.N. Convention and Protocol.
Consequently, incorporating duress into the agency’s interpretation of the persecutor bar would achieve consistency
with the three sources on which Congress repeatedly drew
when enacting the bars: (1) the IRO Constitution as adopted by
the DPA; (2) the exclusions contained in the U.N. Convention
and Protocol; and (3) the liability principles developed by the
371
military tribunals after World War II. A duress defense to the
persecutor bar would also create consistency with the immigration agency’s policy in other similar contexts. The IRO cases
and directives preserved in the Archive did not explicitly con372
sider claims of duress with respect to the persecutor bar. Instead, the cases reflect an inchoate requirement for culpability,
but not a coherent standard. The international military tribunals, however, developed that standard and applied the duress
defense to crimes involving the persecution of civilian populations. The same is true for the interpretation of the exclusions
in the U.N. Convention and Protocol and their implementation
370. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 2–3 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700, 4702.
371. See supra Parts III–IV.
372. Notably, however, the leader of the IRO foreshadowed this defense.
When reconsidering the eligibility status of members of the Baltic SS units in
light of evidence from the military tribunals that forced recruits often chose
these units for their favorable conditions, the IRO Director-General stated
that “only some form of duress on the part of the Germans should be held to
excuse an apparently voluntary act.” IRO Exec. Comm. Memo, supra note 195
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 131) (photo copy on file
with author, 77).
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by numerous States Parties: evidence of duress defeats exclusion. Given this history and the statements of congressional intent, the immigration agency should embrace the opportunity
provided by the Supreme Court to reconsider the bar in full and
follow suit.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The objective effects test articulated by the BIA in In re
373
Laipenieks cannot stand. This interpretation of the persecutor bar is inconsistent with international treaty obligations; inconsistent with statements of congressional intent; inconsistent
with the humanitarian purpose of the many refugee acts Congress has passed; and inconsistent with the bar’s historical
source. After Negusie, the immigration agency has the opportunity to correct this interpretation and incorporate culpability
whether through precedential decision-making or formal rule374
making.
Measuring moral choice through the defense of duress
would resolve these inconsistencies. Duress requires more than
the measure of outside influence sufficient to demonstrate involuntariness. It exculpates only individuals subject to a level
of influence so great as to eliminate the ability to choose a
morally correct course of conduct. The defense requires an imminent and serious threat of harm, no means of escape or alternative action, and causing no more harm to others than the
harm threatened against them. It allows for consideration of
circumstance and counters the notion of willfulness that is inherent in the term “persecution.” By placing the burden on the
applicant, the defense tests an individual’s moral opposition to
the aims of his coercer through the requirement of pursuing all
reasonable means of escape, and consequently the test promotes resistance to participating in persecution, not complicity.
Justices Scalia and Alito suggest a blanket exclusion may be
appropriate because it would substitute concerns for “culpabil-

373. In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 465 (B.I.A. 1983), rev’d,
Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).
374. The Department of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief explains
that the agency was engaged in rulemaking efforts prior to the BIA’s issuance
of its most recent briefing schedule and that the agency will continue to advance its rulemaking efforts in parallel. DHS Supplemental Brief at 2 n.3, In
re Negusie, No. A 015 575 924 (B.I.A. brief filed Apr. 20, 2016) (on file with the
author).
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375

ity” with concerns for “desirability.” But someone who aided
his persecutor only under duress does not lack moral character
and is not inherently undesirable; he is simply a victim.
Massey’s work guides courts in answering the question of
what acts make an individual culpable for the harm caused by
a collective. The contribution of an armed guard, and interpreter, or a police interrogator is enough even if neither the guard,
nor the interpreter, nor the interrogator personally harmed the
376
victim. The contribution of a low-level office clerk in a police
377
force controlled by the SS is not, however. Massey’s test thus
assesses whether someone has sufficiently participated in the
persecution of others so as to trigger the bar. But it does not
complete the culpability analysis when participation is undisputed but moral choice is. Here, the defense of duress steps in.
Allowing a duress defense may lead to the same outcomes
in Fedorenko and Negusie but would do so with a coherent and
378
complete rationale. The Court in Fedorenko did not consider
379
the defense of duress. It determined only that the DPA’s persecutor bar did not contain an “‘involuntary assistance’ excep380
tion.” Indeed, in drawing lines between concentration camp
inmates forced to participate in the horrific functions of Treblinka and the prisoners of war who were standing guard, the
Court looked to factors that evidenced moral choice. It emphasized the fact that Fedorenko was armed, that Russian soldiers
outnumbered their SS captors, that they were paid and able to
leave the camp, that other guards had escaped, and that
381
Fedorenko admitted to shooting at inmates. The Court also
noted that the camp itself was shut down after an armed uprising, which was led by kapos and guards at the time Fedorenko
382
was there, but presumably without his assistance.
Fedorenko’s facts, in sum, fail to show the threat of imminent
harm, the absence of alternatives, or proportionality in the
harm caused.

375. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 526 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
376. Massey, supra note 16, at 130, 148.
377. Id. at 148–49.
378. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 511 (2009); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S.
490 (1981).
379. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490 (1981).
380. Id. at 512.
381. Id. at 500, 512 & n.34, 513 & n.35.
382. Id. at 494.

540

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:453

In contrast, Negusie may be able to make out the duress
defense. He was beaten and imprisoned and then forced to
383
serve as an armed guard in the same military camp. He kept
prisoners in the sun knowing it could lead to death but did not
personally shoot at or punish anyone, and he offered assistance
384
at times. After four years, he was able to escape only by
385
swimming to a shipping container and hiding inside.
Negusie’s own persecution illustrates the presence of serious
threats, the extreme measures required for escape indicates the
lack of alternative choices, and the harm he caused to others
appears to be the same as the harm threatened and imposed on
him through his own persecution.
Fedorenko compared the persecution exclusion to the ene386
my-operations exclusion in the IRO Constitution. Negusie
compared the purpose of the Refugee Act to the purpose of the
387
Displaced Persons Act. Simple comparisons, though, do not
capture the complex history of the persecutor bar’s presence in
U.S. immigration law for the past sixty-five years. Allowing a
duress defense would recover this history, restore congressional
intent, and draw the right lines.

383. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 514–15; DHS Brief in In re Negusie at 3–8,
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 512 (No. 07-499) (on file with the author).
384. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 514–15.
385. Id.
386. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490.
387. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 512.

